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INTRODUCTION
Quietly reading a book by a window in your apartment isn’t
necessarily a “private” act. Many living in densely packed locations like Manhattan inevitably wonder whether eyes peering
through telescopes or watching digital camera screens find them,
linger for a time, capture images or generate fantasies about who
and what they are.1 That appropriation reality popped into public
view in 2013 when Martha and Matthew Foster discovered images
of themselves and their children, Delaney and James, in Arne
Svenson’s photography exhibition The Neighbors mounted at the
Julie Saul Gallery in the Chelsea district of Manhattan.2 The Fosters lived in a modern glass walled building—The Zinc—in northern TriBeCa.3 Arne Svenson lived across the street in a second
1

As a resident of a fourteenth floor apartment across Broadway from two large
residential buildings to the east, such thoughts certainly cross my mind.
2
The gallery is located at 535 West 22nd Street. A book of photos from the exhibition
was recently released. ARNE SVENSON, THE NEIGHBORS (2015) (indicating that the
pictures will be shown at the Museum of Contemporary Art Denver in 2016). For
pictures displayed in the show, see The Neighbors, JULIE SAUL GALLERY,
http://www.saulgallery.com/artists/arne-svenson/neighbors [http://perma.cc/L5AJ-LS
DN] (last visited Sept. 28, 2015). A number of stories about the show have been
published. See, e.g., Ellen Gamermon, The Fine Art of Spying, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 12, 2013,
8:31 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014241278873240947045790651
23679605360 [http://perma.cc/AN8L-EC2W]; Barbara Pollack, When Does Surveillance
Cross the Line, ARTNEWS (Sept. 9, 2014), http://www.artnews.com/2014/09/09/
privacy-and-surveillance-art [http://perma.cc/ZBD2-RMYZ].
3
See Pollack, supra note 2. TriBeCa (local parlance for “triangle below Canal Street,”
even though the neighborhood’s shape is a trapezoid) is located in the southwest part of
Manhattan just north of the Financial District. Much of it is now designated and
controlled as historic. It is filled with old industrial loft buildings that have become some
of the poshest apartments in the city. The Zinc is one of a number of recently constructed
buildings erected on empty or non-historic parcels.
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floor loft at 125 Watts Street.4★ He used a telephoto lens equipped
digital camera to take pictures of the Fosters and others living in
The Zinc while staying in the shadows of his own abode.5 The Fosters sued Svenson and the Julie Saul Gallery, making privacy and
intentional infliction of emotional distress claims.6 They sought
damages and an injunction requiring removal of two pictures of
their family from public and electronic display.7 “According to the
Fosters,” Barbara Pollack wrote in ARTnews, “Svenson is nothing
more than a Peeping Tom, invading their privacy and exploiting
their profiles for commercial gain.”8 The Fosters lost their motion
for preliminary relief in the trial court, a result recently affirmed on
appeal.9

4★

Amanda Gorence, Arne Svenson Takes a Voyeuristic Look Inside the Apartments of His
Tribeca Neighbors, FEATURE SHOOT (Apr. 26, 2013), http://www.featureshoot.com/
2013/04/arne-svenson-takes-a-voyeuristic-look-inside-the-apartments-of-his-tribecaneighbors [http://perma.cc/DJF8-YXTP]. For an image of the buildings, see Richard H.
Chused, The Zinc Building and Svenson’s Loft, APPROPRIATE(D) MOMENTS,
[http://perma.cc/JW6S-2T8V]
(last
http://www.rhchused.com/Moments01.html
visited Sept. 28, 2015).
5
See Gorence, supra note 4.
6
The emotional distress claim did not play much of a role in the first round of
proceedings. The Fosters alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress as a cause of
action in their complaint, dated May 20, 2013, as a result of the photographing and
subsequent promotion of images of their children. See Complaint at 7–8, Foster v.
Svenson, No. 651826/2013, 2013 WL 3989038 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 5, 2013). In the
Memorandum the Fosters filed in support of their motion to enjoin Svenson’s actions,
they argued that Svenson violated various New York civil and criminal statutes, but they
did not mention the emotional distress claim. See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in
Support of Temporary Restraining Order and Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 6–11,
Foster, 2013 WL 3989038 (No. 651826/2013). They mentioned statutes barring unlawful
surveillance (N.Y. PENAL LAW § 250.45(1), (3) (McKinney 2014)); child endangerment
(PENAL § 260.10(1)); and violation of publicity rights (N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51
(McKinney 2014)). See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law, supra, at 1, 6–7. The
defendant’s response, filed in early June, paid scant attention to the emotional distress
claim. See Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of His Motion to Dismiss and in
Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 19–22, Foster, 2013 WL
3989038 (No. 651826/2013). That makes sense. There is scant, if any, evidence that the
level of intentionality and grievous emotional impact required to win this sort of tort claim
was present. This Article deals only with the privacy issues.
7
See sources cited supra note 6.
8
Pollack, supra note 2.
9
See Foster, No. 651826/2013, 2013 WL 3989038, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 5, 2013),
aff’d, 128 A.D.3d 150 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015).
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Most of the pictures in The Neighbors exhibition are, at least in
the eyes of this viewer, aesthetically pleasing.10 The emotional responses of some of those in Svenson’s photographs, however, were
understandably testy. The Fosters were not the only upset residents. Mariel Kravetz, also a resident of The Zinc, invited Jennifer
Bain, a New York Post reporter, to come to her apartment in The
Zinc building to snap pictures of Svenson’s abode across the
street.11 Though Svenson was not visible during the photo shoot, a
medical model in his window was.12★ A photo taken during Bain’s
visit later appeared in the newspaper. She reported that Kravetz
found the effort to be sweet revenge because Kravetz was “horrified” to find out that she appeared in two displayed photos in
Svenson’s show. Kravetz was also concerned he took more pictures of daughter: “‘What does he have that we haven’t seen?’
Kravetz asked Bain. ‘He probably took thousands or more. I have a
young daughter. It’s more than me. Does he have any of her?
That’s my biggest concern.’”13
Svenson’s explanation of his actions—framed from a perspective denying the authenticity of any privacy claims—may have
stoked the anger and anxiety of the Fosters and Kravetz. In a blog
about The Neighbors exhibit published shortly before the show
opened, he was quoted as saying:
10

I include in the aesthetically pleasing category the two images picturing members of
the Foster family.
11
See Jennifer Bain, A Sneak Peek into Tribeca Peeping Photographer’s Apartment, N.Y.
POST (May 23, 2013, 4:00 AM), http://nypost.com/2013/05/23/a-sneak-peek-into-tri
beca-peeping-photographers-apartment [http://perma.cc/2Z6K-8EDU].
12★
Serendipitously, before either the photograph controversy or Bain’s visit to
Kravetz’s apartment, the interior of Svenson’s apartment was featured in a New York
Times article about interior design. Joyce Wadler, Inviting in the Ghosts, N.Y. TIMES: ON
LOCATION, Dec. 5, 2012, at D6. The model was still in the window when I walked by on
March 16, 2015. A picture I took is available at Svenson’s Loft, APPROPRIATE(D)
MOMENTS, www.rhchused.com/Moments02.html [http://perma.cc/6JP3-WKY9] (last
visited Sept. 28, 2015), next to a picture that originally appeared in an online slideshow
that accompanies Wadler’s article, Trevor Tondro, Lions and Tigers and Bears, Oh My,
N.Y. TIMES: ON LOCATION, http://www.nytimes.com/slideshow/2012/12/06/great
homesanddestinations/20121206-LOCATION.html
[http://perma.cc/3KC3-CDPQ]
(last visited Sept. 29, 2015).
13
Bain, supra note 11. During the trial court proceedings, Svenson indicated that he
may have had about fifty pictures of the Foster apartment, though it later turned out that
probably was an overestimate.
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For my subjects there is no question of privacy; they
are performing behind a transparent scrim on a
stage of their own creation with the curtain raised
high. The Neighbors don’t know they are being photographed; I carefully shoot from the shadows of my
home into theirs. I am not unlike the birder, quietly
waiting for hours, watching for the flutter of a hand
or the movement of a curtain as an indication that
there is life within.14
The consequences of the dispute may be visible on-site. When I
walked by the buildings on the afternoon of March 16, 2015, most
of the window shades and curtains were drawn in the apartments
facing Svenson’s. A peek at a Google Street View image of the
same site in June, 2011, however, shows that many of the windows
were uncovered.15 Whether that is a result of Svenson’s actions is
impossible to know without speaking to the residents.16★ But it
would hardly be surprising that some residents would respond by
hiding themselves behind window coverings.17
14

Gorence, supra note 4. In a later interview after the litigation was filed, Svenson gave
a similar, though somewhat less intrusive explanation, for his actions:
I shot for the tiny nuances of gesture and posture that define who we
are, collectively. The subjects are to be seen as representations of
humankind, non-identifiable as the actual people photographed. I was
also intrigued by the way light struck the building/glass, how it
diffused and flattened the subjects within, giving the photographs a
unique palette and an almost painterly presence.
Ken Weingart, An Interview with Photographer Arne Svenson, PETAPIXEL (Mar. 16, 2015),
http://petapixel.com/2015/03/16/interview-with-photographer-arne-svenson
[http://perma.cc/TP5J-SS2Q].
15
GOOGLE MAPS, http://www.maps.google.com (search “125 Watts Street, New
York, NY” (Svenson’s apartment) in the search bar, enter “Street View,” navigate
screen to look across the street at The Zinc building, then click the clock icon and select
“June 2011”) [http://perma.cc/3QK7-PCQ4] (last visited Dec. 18, 2015]).
16★
I have not been successful in obtaining interviews with anyone. An image with most
of the shades down on the lower floors of the Zinc Building is available at Richard H.
MOMENTS,
Chused,
Zinc
Apartment
Shades
Down,
APPROPRIATE(D)
http://www.rhchused.com/Moments03.html [http://perma.cc/V5NV-ZEFF] (last
visited Sept. 28, 2015).
17
If that is happening it is a bit ironic, for some of the larger units in The Zinc are quite
expensive. It is difficult to imagine that someone spending a large sum for a bright, airy
apartment would be pleased when “forced” to lower their shades. According to
StreetEasy, a two-bedroom, 1,675 square-foot apartment sold for $3,180,000 in January,
2015. The Zinc Building at 475 Greenwich Street, STREETEASY, http://streeteasy.com/
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This dispute raises a host of difficult social, cultural, and legal
questions. All of the many friends and colleagues I chatted with
about the Svenson exhibition expressed some form of anxiety,
creepiness, or worry. But they also had difficulty articulating the
basis for their concern. Some worried about the intrusive nature of
such photography only to opine that it wasn’t very different from
being on a street or in a subway when a professional camera wielder
clicks off shots for a coming gallery show. Others wondered why
their likenesses should be the source of funds to an artist before
commenting that professional photographers must have a great
deal of leeway in picking their subjects and deciding what to publicly display. Many wanted to know if the pictures revealed moments
of sexual intimacy or nudity. When I said they did not18 and added
my opinion that many of them were quite beautiful, the reaction
often was, “hmmmmmm . . . .” A few articulated feelings of creepiness only to partially retract them by opining that New Yorkers
expect to be watched in their apartments by all types of eyes when
their shades are up or their curtains are open. In short, puzzlement
and consternation were routine. This Article is a preliminary effort
to unravel some of the perplexity. It is only fair to say at the outset,
however, that firm, bright line resolutions are difficult to discern.
I begin with an historical journey. The first stop is the famous
Warren and Brandeis article, The Right to Privacy, published a century and a quarter ago in the Harvard Law Review.19 The authors
complained about the ways photographers and newspaper reporters “invaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic life” and
building/the-zinc-building#tab_building_detail=2 [http://perma.cc/9SNK-5UTF] (last
visited Sept. 28, 2015).
18
Though, other forms of intimacy are visible. In one picture, what appear to be a man
and woman sit across from each other with their legs on the same footrest. SVENSON,
supra note 2, at Neighbors #1. They are dressed in robes and the lower parts of their legs
(but no upper bodies or faces) are displayed. In another, an obviously pregnant woman
sits on the back of a sofa, again without her face showing. SVENSON, supra note 2, at
Neighbors #8. A third shows the clothed rear end of what appears to be a woman,
apparently cleaning a floor. SVENSON, supra note 2, at Neighbors #5. In one of the
pictures the Fosters complained about, Martha is holding her son upside down. His face
is right in front of the Foster’s daughter who is dressed in a child’s swimsuit. Many
others also display intimate, wholly non-sexual, moments.
19
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890).
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overstepped “the obvious bounds of propriety and of decency.”20
The distant echoes of Warren and Brandeis’ lament resound in the
protests made by Kravetz and the Fosters to Svenson’s The Neighbors exhibition. But almost one hundred twenty-five years passed
between the publication of The Right to Privacy and the mounting of
The Neighbors. Any inquiry into the legal cogency of the Foster
claims therefore must venture into the ways photographic technology, artistic trends, and cultural changes have influenced the creative presentation of moments “appropriated” from the lives of
strangers. That is the second stop in this Article’s journey. I conclude in the third and final part by using the historical inquiries as a
baseline for thinking about the ways legal norms changed over the
course of the last one hundred and twenty five years and for meditating on the wisdom of changing those norms again.
I. WARREN AND BRANDEIS
The famous Warren and Brandeis21★ article is a fascinating
document. The literature on the piece is enormous and continues
to appear.22 In some ways, that is very difficult to explain. For the
piece is a time warp. A careful reading today should produce a
“what’s the big deal” reaction from most readers. It may best be
described as a screed against media gossip—the seemingly insatia-

20

Id. at 195–96.
Images of Warren and Brandeis may be found at Richard H. Chused, Samuel Warren
and Louis Brandeis, APPROPRIATE(D) MOMENTS, http://www.rhchused.com/
Moments04.html [http://perma.cc/XYF6-W7SZ] (last visited Sept. 28, 2015).
22
A small sample of some of the more interesting work discussing the article includes:
HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY
OF SOCIAL LIFE (2010); DON R. PEMBER, PRIVACY AND THE PRESS: THE LAW, THE MASS
MEDIA, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1972); DANIEL SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY
(2008); James H. Barron, Warren and Brandeis: The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193
(1890): Demystifying a Landmark Citation, 13 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 875 (1979); Benjamin E.
Bratman, Brandeis and Warren’s “The Right to Privacy and the Birth of the Right to
Privacy,” 69 TENN. L. REV. 623 (2002); Amy Gajda, What If Samuel D. Warren Hadn’t
Married a Senator’s Daughter?: Uncovering the Press Coverage That Led to “The Right to
Privacy,” 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 35 (2007); Dorothy Glancy, Privacy and the Other Miss
M, 10 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 401 (1989); William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383
(1960); Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy at 50: A Mixed Legacy, 98
CALIF. L. REV. 1887 (2010).
21★
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ble desire of the press to disturb “propriety and . . . decency”23 by
parading the lives and peccadilloes of others before the general
public. The authors’ dyspepsia with newspaper gossip columns
would be met by most today with a shrug. On the other hand, the
article is an intriguing signal about the sorts of social and cultural
dynamics that can produce disarray in theories of privacy. The
combination of forces that led to the article’s penning mirror similar forces at work today—the rapid spread of new forms of media,
cultural fascination with the rich and famous, and the invention of
new and potentially intrusive technologies allowing for much
broader appropriation of moments in the daily lives of unsuspecting
or publicly prominent citizens. Taking a brief look at these two, dichotomous, views of the famous work of Warren and Brandeis will
set the stage for a broader look at the social, cultural and technological developments that made the present-day dispute between the
Fosters and Svenson possible.
A. Time Warp
Warren and Brandeis used strong words to condemn the impact of gossip on society.
The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and of decency. Gossip is
no longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious,
but has become a trade, which is pursued with industry as well as effrontery. To satisfy a prurient
taste the details of sexual relations are spread broadcast in the columns of the daily papers. To occupy
the indolent, column upon column is filled with idle
gossip, which can only be procured by intrusion
upon the domestic circle. The intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing civilization,
have rendered necessary some retreat from the
world, and man, under the refining influence of culture, has become more sensitive to publicity, so that
solitude and privacy have become more essential to
the individual; but modern enterprise and invention
23

Warren & Brandeis, supra note 19, at 196.
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have, through invasions upon his privacy, subjected
him to mental pain and distress, far greater than
could be inflicted by mere bodily injury. Nor is the
harm wrought by such invasions confined to the suffering of those who may be made the subjects of
journalistic or other enterprise. In this, as in other
branches of commerce, the supply creates the demand.24 Each crop of unseemly gossip, thus harvested, becomes the seed of more, and, in direct
proportion to its circulation, results in a lowering of
social standards and of morality. Even gossip apparently harmless, when widely and persistently circulated, is potent for evil. It both belittles and perverts. It belittles by inverting the relative importance of things, thus dwarfing the thoughts and aspirations of a people. When personal gossip attains
the dignity of print, and crowds the space available
for matters of real interest to the community, what
wonder that the ignorant and thoughtless mistake its
relative importance. Easy of comprehension, appealing to that weak side of human nature which is
never wholly cast down by the misfortunes and frailties of our neighbors, no one can be surprised that it
usurps the place of interest in brains capable of other things. Triviality destroys at once robustness of
thought and delicacy of feeling. No enthusiasm can

24

My colleague, Ed Purcell, noted to me after reading a draft of this Article that there
was some irony in this adoption by Warren and Brandeis of the highly controversial,
traditional Say’s Law, stated more fully in JEAN-BAPTISTE SAY, A TREATISE ON POLITICAL
ECONOMY; OR THE PRODUCTION, DISTRIBUTION AND CONSUMPTION OF WEALTH 134–35
(Clement C. Biddle ed., C. R. Prinsep trans., 6th ed. 1855) (“It is worth while to remark
that a product is no sooner created than it, from that instant, affords a market for other
products to the full extent of its own value. When the producer has put the finishing hand
to his product, he is most anxious to sell it immediately, lest its value should diminish in
his hands. Nor is he less anxious to dispose of the money he may get for it; for the value of
money is also perishable. But the only way of getting rid of money is in the purchase of
some product or other. Thus, the mere circumstance of creation of one product
immediately opens a vent for other products.”).
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flourish, no generous impulse can survive under its
blighting influence.25
For some time, much of the writing about the Harvard article
remained fairly constant—continuing speculation about what led
the authors to write it, rather than analysis of the distressing influence of gossip. It certainly is true that disparaging others can be
destructive. The concept of lashon hara (לשון הרע, literally bad or evil
tongue) in Jewish theology attempts to counter the cultural tendency to speak about others in ways that may be harmful even if true.
A wonderful Chasidic tale describes a young man who regularly
gossiped about others. Feeling remorseful he went to speak with a
rabbi about atoning for his deeds. The rabbi told him to get a pillow, cut it open, and let the feathers scatter in the breeze. Though
he thought the request odd, he did as he was told. When he returned to the rabbi to tell him he had completed the task, the rabbi
told him to go retrieve the feathers. His efforts to do so, of course,
failed. When he returned to the rabbi and admitted his inability to
start, let alone complete, retrieving the feathers, he was told “your
words are like the feathers. Once they leave your mouth, you can
never get them back again.”26
But even if displeasure with gossipy media may sometimes be
warranted, it was difficult to understand why Warren and Brandies
were so distressed. It was not clear that newspapers printed anything about either of them in the years before the article appeared
that warranted their wrath. The standard account for many years
was William Prosser’s 1960 statement that Samuel Warren, Louis
Brandeis’ law partner when the article was written, was piqued by
media coverage of his daughter’s marriage.27 That idea was debunked after a bit of genealogical research demonstrated that Warren could not have had a daughter of marriageable age by the time
the Harvard article was published.28 Given the problems with
25

Warren & Brandeis, supra note 19, at 196.
Shoshannah Brombacher, A Pillow Full of Feathers, CHABAD, http://www.chabad.org
/library/article_cdo/aid/812861/jewish/A-Pillow-Full-of-Feathers.htm [http://perma.cc
/KN7P-4KWU] (last visited Sept. 28, 2015) (containing a more complete telling of this
wonderful story).
27
See Prosser, supra note 22, at 423.
28
See Barron, supra note 22, at 892–93.
26
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Prosser’s theory and the failure of scholars to find much 1880s
press coverage of Warren, Brandeis, or their families, there was
little to go on. In the early 1970s, Don Pember managed to find
some support for the pique in correspondence between Warren and
Brandeis and in the memories of descendants of Warren.29 Both
letters and interviews confirmed his aggravation with the media.30
With the publication of Barron’s article on the history of The Right
of Privacy in 197931 and of Amy Gajda’s meticulously researched
2007 essay describing the gossipy media coverage of Samuel Warren and his family during the 1880s, it became possible to more fully explain the origins of the article.32 Gajda discovered that Warren
and his family were mentioned fairly often after his marriage to
Mabel Bayard—the daughter of Senator Thomas F. Bayard of Delaware—in early 1883.33 It now is generally accepted that Warren
was upset at the operation of the press and was the prime mover
behind the Harvard piece.34
But that hardly justifies the wide attention the article has continuously garnered. While gossip often is unattractive, undignified,
sensationalized, and silly, and sometimes decidedly harmful, the
contemporary market for it is intense and cultural tolerance of its
distribution is quite high. Surely current media freedom norms
moot most, if not all, of the behavior Warren and Brandeis decried.
29

See PEMBER, supra note 22, at 24–25.
Pember described Brandeis’ recollections of Warren’s “abhorrence” of privacy
invasions by the press and of the memories of Warren’s dislike of gossip columns
described by his grandson. Id.
31
Barron, supra note 22.
32
Gajda, supra note 22, at 37–40. Gajda’s summary of the prior literature on the
problem also is very meticulous. She writes about Prosser’s error, the prior literature, and
the uncertainty about Warren’s relationship with the press of the items. Id. Some of the
items Gajda referred to were previously revealed by Barron, supra note 22, at 893–94,
902–07. One of the examples described by Gajda was about coverage of Mrs. Warren’s
friendship with Frances Folsom, the quite young wife of President Grover Cleveland.
Folsom was the daughter of the Secretary of State, an ex-law partner of Cleveland. They
had known each other since she was a young child. Their relationship was confirmed
when she was only eighteen years old, twenty-eight years his junior. See Gajda, supra note
22, at 51–53.
33
Gajda, supra note 22, at 36 (explaining that the article examines approximately sixty
newspaper stories from Boston, New York, and Washington, D.C. that reported on the
personal lives of Warren and his family).
34
See id. at 37 & n.8.
30
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Theirs was not dyspepsia about distribution of false information,
highly disparaging remarks, deeply intrusive fact gathering techniques, or profoundly unflattering and insulting observations—
grounds that might support defamation, emotional distress, or privacy tort claims today. They simply did not want others to control
discourse about them.35 Though the newspaper coverage Barron
and Gajda discovered is considered tame today—gossip columns
about visits by or with family and friends, dinner parties, marriages,
dress habits, and funerals—it is clear that the articles got under the
skins of the Harvard authors.36
Though the core of their claim involved antipathy to forms of
gossip that would hardly cause a ripple today, they also couched
their argument in somewhat broader prose that, when carefully
analyzed, might support what we now call a right to publicity.
Recent inventions and business methods call attention to the next step which must be taken for the
protection of the person, and for securing to the individual what Judge Cooley calls the right “to be let
alone.” Instantaneous photographs and newspaper
enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical
devices threaten to make good the prediction that
“what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed
from the house-tops.” For years there has been a
feeling that the law must afford some remedy for the
unauthorized circulation of portraits of private persons; and the evil of the invasion of privacy by the
newspapers, long keenly felt, has been but recently
discussed by an able writer. The alleged facts of a
somewhat notorious case brought before an interior
tribunal in New York a few months ago, directly involved the consideration of the right of circulating
35

See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 19, at 196.
See Barron, supra note 22, at 914–28. Barron strongly drives this notion home.
Claiming that Warren and Brandeis were patrician sorts, deeply uncomfortable with
burgeoning economic shifts and quickly urbanizing American culture, he argues that the
article reflects much more about their desire to define the nature of “proper” journalism
than to protect their personal privacy. Id.

36
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portraits; and the question whether our law will recognize and protect the right to privacy in this and in
other respects must soon come before our courts for
consideration.37
The footnoted sources referenced by Warren and Brandeis in
this brief, but important, excerpt provided remarkably thin, if any,
support for their gossip claims, but they revealed a great deal about
the authors to us. All, save the reference to Cooley’s treatise,38
dealt with the roles of newspapers, gossip, and—of particular importance for this Article—photography in the second half of the
nineteenth century. Two involved newspaper reports of threatened
or pending litigation.39 The other three were brief essays with references to some aspect of privacy.40 The two court cases41 are fas37

Warren & Brandeis, supra note 19, at 195–96 (citing THOMAS M. COOLEY, COOLEY
29 (2d ed., 1880); Joseph A. Jameson, The Legal Relations of Photographs, 8 AM.
L. REG. (n.s.) 1 (1869); George B. Corkhill, Editorial, Portrait Right, 12 WASH. L. REP. 353
(June 7, 1884); Watkin Williams, Letter to the Editor, The Sale of Photographic Portraits,
24 SOLIC. J. & REP. 4–5 (1879); E.L. Godkin, The Rights of the Citizen: To His Reputation, 8
SCRIBNER’S MAG. 65, 67 (July 1890); Marion Manola v. Stevens & Myers, N.Y. TIMES,
June 15, 18, 21, 1890 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1890)). The authors’ reference to the Manola case
added,
[T]he complainant alleged that while she was playing Broadway
Theatre, in a role which required her appearance in tights, she was, by
means of a flash light, photographed surreptitiously and without her
consent, from one of the boxes, by defendant Myers, a photographer,
and prayed that the defendants might be restrained from making use
of the photograph taken. A preliminary injunction issued ex parte, and
a time was set for argument of the motion that the injunction should
be made permanent, but no one then appeared in opposition.
Id. at 195 n.7.
38
This reference by Warren and Brandeis points to an oft noted line from Cooley’s
treatise discussing “Personal Immunity” stating, “The right to one’s person may be said
to be a right of complete immunity: to be let alone. The corresponding duty is, not to
inflict an injury, and not, within such proximity as might render is successful, to attempt
the infliction of an injury.” See COOLEY, supra note 37, at 29. While Warren and Brandeis
obviously were intrigued by the phrase “right . . . to be let alone,” Cooley only discussed
traditional rules of assault and battery in the section. It did not support any claim about
personal privacy as we have to think of it.
39
See Corkhill, supra note 37, at 353; Marion Manola, supra note 37.
40
Jameson, supra note 37; Williams, supra note 37; Godkin, supra note 37.
41
See infra notes 42–52 and accompanying text (discussing the legal action that
followed the publication of stolen images of a few high-society women in Brooklyn) and
notes 53–61 and accompanying text (discussing the legal conflict that occurred when a
ON TORTS
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cinating. Each presented settings in which some form of secretive
use of photography and distribution of images led to objections
from those in the pictures.
The first, briefly summarized in the 1884 Washington Law Reporter editorial cited by Warren and Brandeis, involved contemplated suits
[T]o enjoin the publication, commenced by one of
the daily papers, of portraits of a number of ladies in
society in Brooklyn, on the ground that they were,
or are to be copied from photographs supposed to
have been procured surreptitiously by the publisher,
from the possession of a photographer who had taken photographs of these ladies in the ordinary
course of his business.42
While admitting the existence of a copyright in the photographs, the editorial goes on to opine that the right of the subject of
a photograph “to object to the reproduction of copies is quite
another question” and that recognizing “the proprieties of life”
required drawing a line between well known figures “deemed in
some sense public property” and others retaining a right to object
to “undesired publicity.”43
The editorial referenced by Warren and Brandeis provided only
scant information about the story, but a little digging produced the
details. On June 1, 1884, the Sunday edition of the New York World
published woodcut images of Brooklyn44 society women, along
photographer snapped a picture of actress Marion Manola in a revealing costume during a
performance).
42
Corkhill, supra note 37, at 353.
43
Id.
44
It’s worth noting that according to the 1880 census, Brooklyn was the third largest
city in the United States with 566,663 people, following only New York and Philadelphia.
1880 Fast Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/history/www/through_
the_decades/fast_facts/1880_fast_facts.html [https://perma.cc/GB4Z-6ZLC] (last
visited Sept. 20, 2015). The boroughs were not merged to form New York City as we
know it now until 1898. See Phillip Lopate, The Greatest Year: 1898, N.Y. MAG. (Jan. 9,
2011), http://nymag.com/news/features/greatest-new-york/70466 [https://perma.cc/
TBK8-6U92]. Brooklyn had all the cacophony, problems, highly competitive newspapers,
and gossip of the late-nineteenth century. Today, it is the most populous of the five
boroughs that make up New York City. Borough Trends & Insights, N.Y. ECON. DEV.
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with some comments about them, over the headline “Brooklyn
Belles.”45 The Brooklyn Daily Eagle reported that the “Belles” article “dealt very personally with wives and daughters of some of
the most highly esteemed citizens of Brooklyn.”46 Members of the
effected families expressed outrage at the events, though the commentary was quite tame. Under a woodcut image of Miss May
Whitbeck, for example, a brief paragraph described her as “stylish,
attractive, free-hearted and a favorite upon her first entrance into
the ball-room or reception parlor. At the banquet table she is particularly vivacious, and her wit flows like sparkling wine. She is one
of the most fascinating girls in Brooklyn society.”47★
The images apparently were stolen from the photograph gallery
of Alva Pearsall, turned over to the New York World, and used as a
basis for making the woodcuts. Alva Pearsall was a well-known daguerreotype photographer with a thriving studio at the corner of
Fulton and Flatbush Avenues.48★ His brother, Frank Pearsall, was
an important cameramaker and inventor.49 The women whose images were taken from the gallery represented some elite Brooklyn

CORP., http://www.nycedc.com/resource/borough-trends-insights [http://perma.cc/26
GN-C7YY] (last visited Sept. 28, 2015).
45
The full headline was Brooklyn Belles, Ladies Who Grace and Adorn the Social Circle,
N.Y. WORLD SUPPLEMENT, June 1, 1884, at 1. The story that unfolded in the press after
the New York World article appeared, told as a tale of scandalous gossip, showed up in
Local Belles: A Fierce Storm in Fourteen Brooklyn Families, BROOK. DAILY EAGLE, June 4,
1884, at 4; The Belles: Indignation Concerning the Stolen Photographs Unabated, BROOK.
DAILY EAGLE, June 5, 1884, at 4; and an untitled note in The Independent, June 5, 1884, at
18.
46
Local Belles: A Fierce Storm in Fourteen Brooklyn Families, supra note 45, at 4.
47★
The Whitbeck image and description may be seen at Richard H. Chused, “Brooklyn
MOMENTS,
http://www.rhchused.com/
Belles”
Article,
APPROPRIATE(D)
Moments05.html [http://perma.cc/SYK5-X264] (last visited Sept. 28, 2015).
48★
The details on Pearsall’s life, as well as a picture of his gallery on Fulton, are
available at Alva Pearsall, HISTORIC CAMERA, http://historiccamera.com/cgi-bin/
librarium2/pm.cgi?action=app_display&app=datasheet&app_id=2027 [http://perma.cc/
MUV8-FXK7] (last visited Sept. 29, 2015). The gallery picture also is shown at Richard
MOMENTS,
H.
Chused,
The
Pearsall
Gallery,
APPROPRIATE(D)
http://www.rhchused.com/Moments06.html [http://perma.cc/B7XL-PPDT] (last
visited Sept. 29, 2015).
49
A compact, fold-up camera he developed in 1883 is pictured at Compact Camera, c.
1883, ANTIQUE & 19TH CENTURY CAMERAS, http://www.antiquewoodcameras.com/
Pearsall-Camera.html [http://perma.cc/WN5B-RBX9] (last updated Sept. 28, 2015).
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families.50 Pearsall, after being publicly chastised by an anonymous
Daily Eagle letter writer “indignant at this outrage,”51 responded
that he “would be a fit subject for a lunatic asylum to part with the
photographs of my lady patrons for illustration in a paper and expect at the same time to keep their patronage.”52 Though the
Washington Law Reporter editorial cited by Warren and Brandeis
focused on the undesired gossip and publicity foisted upon the society women of Brooklyn, one can surmise that a court would have
sympathized with any effort to suppress the commercial use of pictures obtained surreptitiously without the consent of either the
photographer or the subjects. But, despite the gloss put on the tiff
by the Washington Law Reporter and the other newspaper commentators on the dispute, it was less a “privacy” dispute in modern
terms than a kerfuffle about access to and control of flattering gossip, as well as conversion and copyright ownership of pictures.
The other case referenced by Warren and Brandeis—involving
the famous singer and comic opera performer Marion Manola—
has been the subject of wide discussion, both during and after their
era.53 While performing in Castles in the Air for the De Wolf Hop50

They included the families of General A. C. Barnes, General James Jourdan, and Mr.
John A. Nichols. Barnes, a veteran, was a prominent member of the National Guard and
an important officer of the American Book Company, a large publishing house. See JAMES
DE MANDEVILLE, HISTORY OF THE 13TH REGIMENT 175 (1894); Gen. A. C. Barnes Dead,
THE SUN, Nov. 29, 1904, at 2; General A. C. Barnes, CORNELL DAILY SUN, Nov. 29, 1904,
at 1. Jourdan also was involved in the military as the Colonel of the 13th Regiment, and
served as the Police Commissioner of Brooklyn and head of the Brooklyn Gas Company.
He was on the boards of other gas companies, as well as banks and railroads. General
Jourdan Dies in 79th Year, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1910, at 11. Nichols was a prominent
lawyer, a member of the Union League Club of New York and the Hamilton Club of
Brooklyn, and an important personage in the Episcopal Church. 2 THE EAGLE AND
BROOKLYN: THE RECORD OF THE PROGRESS OF THE BROOKLYN DAILY EAGLE 1068 (Henry
W.B. Howard & Arthur N. Jervis eds., 1893).
51
A letter to the editor with this phrase and signed by “An Interested Party” appeared
the day before Pearsall’s letter was published. Letter to the Editor, BROOK. DAILY EAGLE,
June 4, 1884, at 4.
52
Alva Pearsall, Letter to the Editor, BROOK. DAILY EAGLE, June 5, 1884, at 4.
53
The best source by far is Dorothy Glancy’s article, Privacy and the Other Miss M,
supra note 22. Glancy compares the stories of Marion Manola and Bette Midler, both
famous singers and performers who brought publicity rights cases against those seeking to
use aspects of their personalities for commercial purposes. As described in great and
glorious detail by Glancy in her article, Manola objected to the use of a flash picture taken
during one of her performances in advertisements for the play. Id. at 402–19. Midler won
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per Company in 1890,54 a photographer snapped a picture of her
from a box seat at the behest of those staging the performance.
This probably was not done with a small device. Though some
cameras were compact enough at that time to be concealed, the use
of a bulky flash surely was both visible and clamorous. Manola
stomped off the stage at the affront and filed an action seeking to
bar use of the picture to advertise the show. The description of the
events in the New York papers and the way they were used by
Warren and Brandeis differed in subtle but important ways. Here is
the brief report of the affair in the June 15, 1890 issue of the New
York Times referred to by Warren and Brandeis:
The alleged difficulty of the management of the
De Wolf Opera Company in having its prima donna,
Marion Manola, photographed in tights was overcome at the Broadway Theatre last evening. A photographer was placed in one of the boxes, and when
an opportunity occurred during the performance a
flash light was used and a photograph of the actress
was secured.
When Miss Manola realized what had been done
she threw her mantle over her face and ran off the
stage. She returned, however, to finish her performance. The photographer made no attempt to conceal his presence in the box, but on the contrary,
seemed to do all he could to attract the attention of
the audience. In this he succeeded fully.
It is alleged that Miss Manola refused to be photographed in tights owing to her modesty. The management, however, wanted such a photograph for lithograph purposes,55 and resorted to this device to
a famous case against Ford Motor Company for using one of her ex-backup singers to
mimic her voice in TV ads for the Mercury Sable, first introduced to the market in 1985.
Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849.F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988); 1986 Mercury Sable TV
Commercial, YOUTUBE (Mar. 4, 2007), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BjIstCzsppA
[http://perma.cc/2EQA-YA5H].
54
The musical comedy opened on May 5, 1890. It was performed 105 times and closed
on August 16, 1890. GERALD MARTIN BORDMAN & RICHARD NORTON, AMERICAN
MUSICAL THEATRE: A CHRONICLE 117 (4th ed. 2010).
55
This was a common technique for making advertising copy.
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obtain it. Who will say that the average theatre manager does not know how to advertise his company?56
It is reasonably clear from this little news item, as well as an array of other circumstances, that Manola’s modesty was not the real
issue. Other pictures of her in tights, including the 1890 Newsboy
“cabinet card”57 and another taken when dressed in her Castles in
the Air costume, were in circulation at the time.58★ Newsboy published many cabinet cards during the Manola era. They were used
as premiums and giveaways when other products, like cigarettes,
were purchased. Manola surely agreed to have this picture, as well
as the Castles in the Air pose, taken. And it is hard to believe that
money was not exchanged. Modesty was not the problem.59 Control of the pose and compensation were. In short, it was what we
now call a publicity rights case—one in which Manola claimed the
right to decide how and when her image would be used for commercial purposes. That notion is given additional credence by the
sensationalized way the picture was taken from a box seat, the slow
sale of tickets for Castles in the Air, and the reputation of Manola as
a temperamental personage.60 Those running the production
needed a publicity boost and found a way to get it. They eventually
agreed not to use the picture.
56

Photographed in Tights, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1890, at 2 (cited in Warren & Brandeis,
supra note 19, at 195 n.7).
57
For a brief history of the “cabinet card,” see Cabinet Card, CITY GALLERY,
http://www.city-gallery.com/learning/types/cabinet_card/index.php [http://perma.cc/
K6UX-HGUM] (last visited Sept. 29, 2015). The Manola cabinet card is available in the
Ohio State University graphics collection at Marion Manola, OHIO ST. U.,
http://hdl.handle.net/1811/47628 [http://perma.cc/6ARF-L5GC] (last visited Sept. 28,
2015).
58★
To view the Castles in the Air image, see Glancy, supra note 22, at 403, and Richard
H. Chused, Manola Castles in the Air Costume, APPROPRIATE(D) MOMENTS, http://www.
rhchused.com/Moments08.html [http://perma.cc/VA3L-5L5U] (last visited June 8,
2015).
59
Glancy suggests that a particular modesty issue was part of the story. Manola had a
young daughter, Adelaide, in Catholic school. Protecting her from negative portrayals of
her mother, Glancy argues, was an issue. If that is right, it could only have been because
of the way in which a particular scene in a picture taken by surprise appeared to a viewer.
That probably would not be an issue of modesty, however, so much as a manifestation of a
desire to control both visual perspective and business dealings. See Glancy, supra note 22,
at 414–15.
60
See id. at 407–11.
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But when Warren and Brandeis described the Brooklyn society
lady and Manola disputes, they left a somewhat different impression about the nature of the issues at stake. They didn’t discuss
issues of theft, conversion, appropriation, commercial exploitation,
or publicity rights. As noted above, they opined that the two cases
“directly involved the consideration of the right of circulating portraits; and the question whether our law will recognize and protect
the right to privacy in this and in other respects must soon come
before our courts for consideration.”61 For them the issue was not
about commercial exploitation, but the ways in which the distribution of pictures and gossip interfered with the ability of citizens to
construct a commodious existence on their own terms. In short,
the actual disputes in the cases they referred to simply didn’t support the gossip theory they wrote about.
The other three sources used by Warren and Brandeis did not
involve litigation—threatened or otherwise. Two had virtually
nothing to do with their notions of privacy.62 They, like the use of
the Brooklyn society pictures and the Manola dispute, are not helpful in defining the nature of the privacy interests Warren and Brandeis wished to protect. Rather, the references simply confirm the
lack of serious legal precedent supporting the claims they made.
Only one—the essay by E.L. Godkin63—deserves any extended
attention. In some ways, it is the most interesting and least persuasive of the lot.64★ As James Barron convincingly noted almost four
61

Warren & Brandeis, supra note 19, at 195–96.
Jameson, supra note 37; Williams, supra note 37.
The American Law Register item is an essay almost entirely about the evolution of
evidence rules for the use of photographic images. Only on the last page is there a very
brief foray into clandestinely taken pictures that are either defamatory or used for
commercial purposes. Jameson, supra note 37, at 8. Jameson was an important lawyer and
judge in Chicago. He died the year Warren and Brandeis published their article. E.O.
JAMESON, THE JAMESONS IN AMERICA: 1647–1900 373–75 (1901).
The Solicitors’ Journal item is from a British publication. It is a short snippet about
the impact of introducing copyright protection into English law beginning in 1862. See
Williams, supra note 37. The issue was ownership of the negative and the photograph
given the presence of legal rules about both intellectual property and tangible property. It
has very little, if anything, to do with the claims made by Warren and Brandeis.
63
See Godkin, supra note 37, at 58.
64★
An image of Godkin is available at Richard H. Chused, E.L. Godkin, APPROPRIATE(D)
MOMENTS, http://www.rhchused.com/Moments09.html [http://perma.cc/Z9LA-WVEK]
(last visited Sept. 28, 2015).
62
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decades ago, much of the Warren-Brandeis article was anticipated
in Godkin’s essay, The Rights of the Citizen: To His Own Reputation,
published in Scribner’s Magazine the same year.65 Godkin linked
the idea of privacy to the growth of civilization. “Privacy,” he
wrote, “is a distinctly modern product, . . . unknown in primitive
or barbarous societies.”66 In prose reeking with class elitism, Godkin claimed, “To have a house of one’s own is the ambition of
nearly all civilized men and women, and the reason which most
makes them enjoy it is the opportunity it affords of deciding for
themselves how much or how little publicity should surround their
daily lives.”67 He concluded this segment of the essay with attitudes sure to draw disdain from many in contemporary western
society.
Of course, the importance attached to this privacy
varies in individuals. Intrusion on it afflicts or annoys different persons in different degrees. It annoys women more than men, and some men very
much more than others. To some persons it causes
exquisite pain to have their private life laid bare to
the world, others rather like it; but it may be laid
down as a general rule that the former are the element in society which most contributes to its moral
and intellectual growth, and that which the state is
most interested in cherishing and protecting.68
Needless to say, gossipy media was the enemy of privacy to
Godkin. Those who craved attention and sought out press coverage
were “depraved!”69 Nonetheless, he did not conclude that the law
could provide a remedy for the problem. Short of defamation, it
was difficult to legislate a solution. The only remedy, he claimed,
was “to be found in attaching social discredit to invasions of it [privacy] on the part of the conductors of the press.”70 Here, of
course, is the point where Warren and Brandeis “improved” upon
65
66
67
68
69
70

Barron, supra note 22, at 886–88.
Godkin, supra note 37, at 65.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 66–67.
Id. at 67.
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Godkin’s theory by seeking creation of a tort remedy where none
existed. But, they did so in ways that closely tracked Godkin’s
ideas—not only in the way they described the issues, but also in
defining the scope of the rule they wished to establish. Publication
of material “of public or general interest” was not barred,71 and
oral gossip, where injury ordinarily was deemed “trifling,” was excluded from coverage altogether in the absence of some form of
special damage.72 The focus clearly was on personal gossip displayed in the press.
Like Godkin, Warren and Brandeis associated with the Mugwumps—often described as members of the upper class led by fear
of “social and economic displacement” to support “independent
politics and conservative reforms.”73 According to Barron, the
Warren and Brandeis article therefore can be read as a Mugwumpian effort to protect society from the “debilitating effects of gossip” by defending a “traditional, ‘patrician’ perception of what
was ‘news,’ what was of public interest and therefore publishable.”74 To the extent this is an accurate portrayal of the motivations of Warren and Brandeis, it simply reaffirms the notion that
the core of their article has little to say about either publicity rights
or present-day privacy debates. Its continuing popularity, therefore, may have much more to do with their magical incantation of
the word “privacy” than with any important substantive claim.
Single lines in the piece, abstracted from the norm they wished to
create, took on a life of their own. And so “the right to be let
alone”75 has become a talisman—one that resonated for the Fos71

Warren & Brandeis, supra note 19, at 214.
Id. at 217 (citing Godkin, supra note 37, at 66).
73
Barron, supra note 22, at 915.
74
Id. at 916. It might be worth speculating that this notion of a distinction between
what was private and what was worthy of public discourse mirrored the similar late
nineteenth-century efforts to distinguish between private and public in an array of other
arenas. The former, such as economic preferences and contractual terms, were none of
the government’s business. Involvement of the public was only appropriate when
regulation, or perhaps revelation of information, was designed to protect the general
welfare. Compare, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding that the
regulation of hours of male bakers violated substantive due process), with Muller v.
Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (holding that the supposed need to protect women from the
demands of market forces justified regulating the length of their work day).
75
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 19, at 193.
72
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ters even though its most famous theoretical roots may have little
to do with their problem.
B. Predictions of the Future
Lawrence Friedman put a subtly different cultural gloss than
Barron and Godkin on the mood of some parts of elite society in
the late nineteenth-century.76 He suggested that the same notions
that Warren and Brandeis used to urge controls over gossip arose
from efforts to suppress distribution of unfavorable information, in
part to provide room for those of the middle and upper classes to
fail and later redeem themselves.77 Protection of reputation, rather
than merely suppression of gossip, was viewed as a way to guard
society from the unnecessary harm that might be caused to all by
the “fall” of important, typically male, figures working generally
for the betterment of society.78 As a result, Friedman concluded,
[O]ne can detect two concerns in American law in
the nineteenth century . . . . These concerns seem to
contradict each other. The law expressed and enforced a strict code of traditional morality. Yet the
law also protected the reputations of respectable
people—even when they strayed somewhat from
the straight and narrow path. . . . At many points the
concept of privacy underlay the central argument—
the idea that certain things (notably, the sexual side
of life) had to be kept secret, kept private. Protecting reputation in an important sense meant protecting privacy, protecting the sanctity of the private
realm, warts and all, especially or primarily for elite
76

See LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, GUARDING LIFE’S DARK SECRETS: LEGAL AND SOCIAL
CONTROLS OVER REPUTATION, PROPRIETY AND PRIVACY 6–10 (2007). For a lengthy
review of and commentary on Friedman’s work, see Paul M. Schwartz, From Victorian
Secrets to Cyberspace Shaming, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1407 (2009).
77
FRIEDMAN, supra note 76, at 6–10.
78
Id. at 6–7. Efforts to protect the elite from controversy, of course, were not always
successful. Perhaps the best known is the Beecher-Tilton Controversy and subsequent
trials over allegations that the famous pastor Henry Ward Beecher had an affair with
Theodore Tilton’s wife, Elizabeth. The story behind the scandal that first erupted into
public view in 1872 is beautifully told in BARBARA GOLDSMITH, OTHER POWERS: THE AGE
OF SUFFRAGE, SPIRITUALISM, AND THE SCANDALOUS VICTORIA WOODHULL (1998).
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and respectable people. The actual law of “privacy,” explicitly using the word, is largely a creation
of the twentieth century.79
It is not surprising, therefore, that a notion of the “private
realm” blossomed in the late nineteenth century—not as protection from unreasonable intrusions, but as a system to protect the
burgeoning middle class from threats to reputation. As the middle
and upper classes grew, travel became easier, and the press proliferated, Warren, Brandeis, and their peers claimed an entitlement to
control how the public learned about reputation. The shift did not
represent a change in the underlying and long-standing sense
among many of the elite that their lives should be largely inaccessible by others, but in the felt need to warn an increasingly intrusive
world of the need to observe traditional boundaries. The rapid increase in the number, circulation, and competitive instincts of the
press in the late nineteenth century surely added to the concerns
among the upper crust.80 That, perhaps, is why extrapolation of the
concerns of Warren and Brandeis into contemporary life is warranted. Though Warren and Brandeis bemoaned the deleterious
effects of published—often trivial—gossip, some of the examples
they cited involved the taking and distribution of pictures, and their
text enunciated great concern about the spread and use of the then
modern contraptions like concealed cameras.81 Publication of images of Brooklyn socialites and a comic opera singer in tights,
though having little if anything to do with gossip, became symbols
to the authors, and later, readers, of the overreaching, intrusive
characteristics of the media that might cause permanent harm. So
did the use of cameras.

79

FRIEDMAN, supra note 76, at 213.
See, e.g., GERALD J. BALDASTY, THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF NEWS IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY 113–46 (1992). The number of daily newspapers in the United
States peaked in the very early 1900s. Circulation reached its first peak around 1920
before leveling off in the 1930s and rising to its all time peak during World War II. See
Matthew Gentzkow, Edward L. Glaeser, & Claudia Goldin, The Rise of the Fourth Estate:
How Newspapers Became Informative and Why It Mattered, in CORRUPTION AND REFORM:
LESSONS FROM AMERICA’S ECONOMIC HISTORY 187, 191–92, 196 (Edward L. Glaeser &
Claudia Goldin, eds., 2006).
81
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 19, at 211.
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As noted above, Warren and Brandeis bemoaned the arrival of
“instantaneous photographs” that have “invaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic life.”82 Even here the focus is on
private and domestic life—gossip about luncheon dates, weddings,
and funerals. What was important to Warren and Brandeis may be
mundane to us, but that surely does not negate the possibility that
use of modern tools to appropriate intimate moments and distribute them widely raises a host of boundary issues for citizens of
today’s world that are related to but quite different from the lines
drawn by Warren and Brandeis. Clearly, there are many contemporary instances of malicious, digital, online discussions of peoples’
lives, and extremely harmful, viral displays of personal images facilitated by ubiquitous cell phone single-shot and video cameras.83
There were at least three characteristics of late nineteenthcentury newspaper gossip that upset Warren and Brandeis and
their elite colleagues—the authoring of stories about middle and
upper class citizens without review by the subjects and the publication of information without consent; the personal, domestic and
family nature of the published information; and the difficulty in
questioning or second-guessing the content of the information revealed. The invention of photography, increasingly smaller cameras, rapid methods of communication such as the telegraph, and
speedy printing techniques made the media seem threatening to
them. What previously was kept within the boundaries of class
based oral discourse became fodder for public display in the published media. What previously was kept fenced in by the desire of
middle and upper class men to protect themselves and their peers
became subject to comment and criticism among the broader and
supposedly less well-mannered body politic. The analogous con82

Id. at 195; see supra discussion Part I.A.
See, e.g., Marcy Peek, The Observer and the Observed: Re-imagining Privacy
Dichotomies in Information Privacy Law, 8 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 51 (2009);
DANIELLE CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE (2014); DANIEL SOLOVE, THE FUTURE
OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET (2007). This
observation is not intended to refer only or even to defamation. Online statements or
images of people can have deleterious consequences when not harmful in ways cognizable
in now traditional privacy litigation settings. The recent “reemergence” of Monica
Lewinsky as a spokesperson for the sort of online shaming that can easily spread online is
only one of many examples. Jessica Bennett, In Her Own Voice: Monica Lewinsky Is Back,
but This Time It’s on Her Terms, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2015, at ST1.
83
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cerns felt by the Fosters were the surreptitious nature of Svenson’s
picture-taking, the ubiquity of tiny cameras and other devices capable of quickly catching intimate moments, the use of images of
people without their consent, the domestic, home-bound nature of
the places depicted in the pictures, the display of the pictures in a
public gallery space, and the distribution of images online.84 The
Fosters did not complain about gossip. But they did want to reduce
the impact modern technology has on the ability of unsuspecting
citizens to control the way they were depicted to others.85 That, in
modern terms, is at least partly analogous to what drove Warren
and Brandeis to protest in the pages of the Harvard Law Review.
II. THIS HISTORICAL JOURNEY: PHOTOGRAPHY, ART, AND
CULTURE
The camera is the common theme. It has been a revelatory tool
for almost two centuries—glancing into and preserving fleeting
moments of our deeply flawed memories or aiding the construction
of deceptively lifelike portrayals in paintings and drawings. Photography, once the domain of specialists and artists, is now a routine
and often spontaneous or happenstance event.86 In the last century
photographs have morphed from a symbol of public gossip disturbing to the elite into a ubiquitous witness and intruder in the daily
lives of the masses. But as change occurred in the technology, use,
and distribution of photographs over the century and a half after
the invention of compact cameras, several things remained constant—the potential for taking pictures without the knowledge of
the human subject, the ability to preserve pictures for significant
periods of time, and the capacity to display images to many people.
The historical developments in these arenas are the next stops in
working through the issues in the Foster/Svenson dispute. What has
been the history of surreptitious photography, art, and the “right to
84

See supra text and sources accompanying notes 6–8.
See supra text and sources accompanying notes 6–8.
86
I can’t help but recall the “Zapruder film.” While innocently capturing President
Kennedy’s motorcade as it passed through Dallas, Abraham Zapruder ended up with
images of the assassination. If you are desperate to watch it, see Zapruder Film Slow
Motion (HIGH QUALITY), YOUTUBE (Oct. 1, 2011), https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=iU83R7rpXQY [http://perma.cc/UA5U-8WE3], for a sequence of the film.
85
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be let alone?” What sorts of controversies, debates, or disputes, if
any, arose about use of cameras and photography?
A. The Camera
It is generally agreed that what we now call the camera first appeared in the 1820s. The “camera obscura”87 was known for centuries before the first true cameras materialized. Light passing
through a small aperture into a darkened space would exit the other
end and produce an inverted image on a surface or wall.88 Artists
used the phenomenon, along with mirrors to right the appearance,
to produce pictures and develop understanding of perspective.89 It
also was known for centuries that certain silver salts darkened
when exposed to light. It was not until the Frenchman Joseph
Nicéphore Niépce, after years of experimentation, put the imaging
and chemical processes together to produce the first photographs.
A few years after his successful experiments, Niépce teamed up
with another Frenchman studying photography—Louise Jacques
Mande Daguerré—in efforts to improve the process. After Niépce
died in 1833, Daguerré perfected what came to be called “daguerreotypes”—exposures on metal plates covered with silver iodide
and bathed in mercury vapor after exposure to light that produced
highly detailed images.90 The process, announced in 1839, was
used to produce many pictures that retain their fine appearance
today.91 Once the process became public, improvements rapidly

87

This is a Latin phrase literally meaning “dark chamber.” Camera Obscura, OXFORD
UNIV. PRESS, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/cam
era-obscura [http://perma.cc/P56B-YBKJ] (last visited Nov. 13, 2015).
88
TODD GUSTAVSON, CAMERA: A HISTORY OF PHOTOGRAPHY FROM DAGUERREOTYPE
TO DIGITAL 2–4 (2009).
89
Indeed, Tim Jeminson claimed in the 2013 documentary film Tim’s Vermeer that
Johannes Vermeer used a camera obscura to make his famous seventeenth-century
paintings. For a review of the film, see David Itzkoff, Tim Jenison, an Inventor, Paints
“The Music Lesson,” N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2013, at AR21.
90
GUSTAVSON, supra note 88, at 6.
91
Id. at 46; see also BEAUMONT NEWHALL, THE HISTORY OF PHOTOGRAPHY: FROM 1839
TO THE PRESENT 18–19 (1982). Others had previously managed to produce images in the
dark that deteriorated when exposed to light. Preserving them was the true dividing line
between image creation and what we now know of as photography. It also appears that an
Englishman, William Henry Fox Talbot, invented a quite similar process to
daguerreotypes at about the same time. See NEWHALL, supra, at 19–21.
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accumulated.92 Commercial studios opened to take pictures and
sell portraits, and camera enhancements emerged.93 Having daguerreotypes made became a fad, especially in France, England,
and the United States; millions of individual and family portraits
were created.94 Dozens of studios opened in major cities. But it was
a time consuming and somewhat laborious process to get a high
quality daguerreotype. Those wanting a picture had to sit perfectly
still for over thirty seconds.95 While mass production, assembly line
type businesses produced images in less than half an hour, the finer
studios took significantly more time. Daguerreotypes also were fragile and required encasement behind glass. In addition, the lack of
easily portable cameras and equipment to produce the final images
left picture taking largely in the hands of commercial establishments.96
A number of changes had to occur before photography could
move out of the studio and into the hands of the general, middle
class citizenry. First, a way had to be found to avoid the need to
produce an image directly from exposure to light. If the picture surface or plate could be held aside and developed later, the camera
and its related paraphernalia could more easily be moved from
place to place. Decisions about which of multiple exposures should
be preserved could be delayed. Second, the exposure time required
to make an image had to be reduced—not simply to ease the labor
of posing but also to make outdoor photography of changing scenery, unstable objects, or moving figures possible. Both of these
improvements emerged during the early 1840s with the “calotype.” It was perfected by William Talbot, one of the original developers of photography, in the 1830s.97
92

See GUSTAVSON, supra note 88, at 8–16 (explaining briefly twelve daguerreotype
cameras, produced by camera makers in France and the United States from 1839 to 1851,
that improved upon, or altered, the original design).
93
Id. at 11.
94
Id. at 11, 17; see also NEWHALL, supra note 91, at 32.
95
See NEWHALL, supra note 91, at 32 (“It was hard work to be daguerreotyped; you had
to cooperate with the operator, forcing yourself not only to sit still for about half a minute,
but also to assume a normal expression.”).
96
See id. at 30.
97
Id. at 43–46; see also GUSTAVSON, supra note 88, at 21. The word “calotype” derives
from a Greek word meaning “beautiful picture.” Talbot perfected the use of paper
covered in silver iodide to make images, a significant advance over metal daguerreotypes.
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But the invention of the calotype and similar processes was not
enough to easily move photography out of the studio and onto the
street. Taking pictures still required the use of bulky equipment
and complicated development techniques. While expeditions carrying equipment around the globe on ships and beasts of burden occurred, they were neither easy nor cheap to mount. Shots of outdoor scenes began to appear early in the history of photography but
it was not until after the middle of the nineteenth century that photography fully blossomed.98 The final steps in making photography
a creature of the masses required that picture taking be simple, that
preservation of multiple shots for long periods of times prior to development be easy, and that carrying a camera virtually anywhere
be a breeze. When small, easily portable cameras emerged after the
Civil War—first in England and then in the United States—the
stage was set for surreptitious picture taking.99 And the subversive
possibilities became quite obvious as cameras placed inside pistols,
book covers, cravats, binocular cases, purses, watches and briefcases became available.100 Kodak, founded in 1888, took full advantage
of the trend by heavily marketing its pocket cameras, perfecting
fairly cheap and easy to use film rolls, and creating a widely available system for developing pictures.101★ The stage—both personal
and artistic—was set.
B. Early Surveillance Photography
This is not the place to attempt a comprehensive survey of surveillance photography over the last century. Much has been written
and the field is quite large. One recent museum project, however,
serves well as an entrée into the field. In 2010 and 2011 the San
Francisco Museum of Modern Art and the Tate Modern in Lon98

See GUSTAVSON, supra note 88, at 38, 44.
Id. at 100–13.
100
Id. at 99–113. The pictures of such cameras in Gustavson’s book are quite
remarkable.
101★
See Richard H. Chused, Early Kodak Camera Advertisement, APPROPRIATE(D)
MOMENTS, http://www.rhchused.com/Moments10.html [http://perma.cc/D2KCMDZT] (last visited Sept. 28, 2015), for an image of an early Kodak ad. I have also posted
pictures of early Kodak cameras on my website. See Richard H. Chused, Early Kodak
Cameras, APPROPRIATE(D) MOMENTS, http://www.rhchused.com/Moments11.html
[http://perma.cc/338T-QB9T] (last visited Sept. 28, 2015).
99
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don jointly mounted an exhibition called Exposed.102 It was an exploration of the ways in which photography and voyeurism are related. The show, displayed for a time at each museum, was divided
into five segments—The Unseen Photographer, Voyeurism and Desire, Celebrity and the Public Gaze, Witnessing Violence, and Surveillance.103 The wide-ranging show confirmed that once the camera
became easily available for use in a broad cross section of human
activities, pictures capturing private moments, artistic compositions, politically charged environments, violence, war, scandal, and
disfavored activities proliferated. Some of the most famous photographs in American history were on display at the museums. Wellknown images taken by Jacob Riis and published in 1890 in his classic muckraking book How the Other Half Lives were among the earliest surreptitiously-taken photographs.104 Some of the pictures by
Walker Evans displayed in Let Us Now Praise Famous Men—an
equally famous volume that came to personify the hardships of the
Great Depression—also were taken secretly.105 Evans’ later book,
Many Are Called, contained covertly-taken images of people on the
New York City subway system during the 1930s and 1940s.106 In
these and many other examples displayed in the Tate/San Francis-
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Exposed: Voyeurism, Surveillance and the Camera, Exhibition Guide, TATE,
http://www.tate.org.uk/whats-on/tate-modern/exhibition/exposed/exposed-voyeurismsurveillance-and-camera-exhibition-guide [http://perma.cc/LEJ3-GPPF] (last visited
Nov. 16, 2015).
103
Id. A companion book to the exhibition was published. EXPOSED: VOYEURISM,
SURVEILLANCE AND THE CAMERA SINCE 1870 (Sandra S. Phillips ed., 2010) [hereinafter
EXPOSED: VOYEURISM]. Each museum has a page on their website devoted to the
exhibition. See Exposed, TATE, www.tate.org.uk/whats-on/tate-modern/exhibition/
exposed [http://perma.cc/M576-N4S4] (last visited Sept. 28, 2015).
104
JACOB RIIS, HOW THE OTHER HALF LIVES (1890).
105
JAMES AGEE & WALKER EVANS, LET US NOW PRAISE FAMOUS MEN (Houghton
Mifflin Co. ed. 1960) (1941). The book was also reissued in 2001 with enhanced versions
of the photographs taken by Evans.
106
WALKER EVANS, MANY ARE CALLED (First Metro. Museum of Art/Yale Univ. Press
ed., 2004) (1966). The book was not published for many years after the pictures were
taken. The subway project recently became a principle event in a well-received novel. See
AMOR TOWLES, RULES OF CIVILITY (2011). Its connection to Evans is described in
reviews. See, e.g., Liesl Shillinger, Romantic Mischief in 1930s Manhattan, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 12, 2011, at BR20; Sarah Coleman, Rules of Civility and Subway Photos, LITERATE
LENS (Jan. 12, 2012), http://theliteratelens.com/2012/01/12/rules-of-civility-and-sub
way-photos [http://perma.cc/S8R3-RV4A].
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co exhibition, the photographs now are highly valued artistic, political, and cultural classics of America and other nations.
From early on some photographers felt the tension between
their artistic and political goals and the sensibilities of those either
in the images or viewing the pictures. Jacob Riis, however, was not
one of them. Many of the photographs in How the Other Half Lives
were the product of invasive behavior.107 Carrying a newfangled
flash camera, he ventured with colleagues into the tenement house
districts of New York, often at night, taking pictures of people in a
variety of settings. Sometimes he caught sleeping vagrants and
children, both on the street and inside living quarters. Others captured people carousing in back alleys and hallways. Permission was
not sought. Sandra Phillips, senior curator at the San Francisco
Museum of Modern Art, explained Riis’s activities.
Riis walked through the tough parts of lower
Manhattan describing the deplorable conditions in
which poor people lived. But what made his descriptive prose even more powerful were the photographs that accompanied it, made possible by the
recent discovery of the magnesium flare and the
flash gun . . . . Riis and some friends, mainly amateur photographers, went at night into the most destitute neighborhoods and photographed in dark alleys, small rooms, even basements, often while the
subjects were sleeping. The press called these photographers “the intruders,” and Riis’s pictures
seemed especially intrusive when they were seen,
greatly enlarged, in his popular lantern slide shows,
his principle means of showing them to the public . . . .
Although his intent was to promote an improved
standard of living for the poor, protect society from
endangerment, and preserve humane intimacy,
many of Riis’s photographs are almost shockingly
invasive, a sense reinforced by the brutal, assaultive
flash, especially potent in photographs made in107

See RIIS, supra note 104.
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doors of the sleeping poor. Even when awake, these
people were sometimes so dead tired, inebriated, or
desperate they seemed not to care, or even by aware
that the man in front of them, focusing his camera
and igniting the flare.108
Phillips, with her modern sensibilities about privacy in sleeping
quarters, expressed shock at the intrusive nature of pictures such as
the one I have posted online.109★ While her reaction is understandable in contemporary terms, the issues were not at all the same for
Riis. He was much more interested in adventure, the “art” of photography, and charitable reforms than he was in the feelings of his
pictorial subjects. It is quite likely that his perceptions were influenced by sensibilities virtually opposite those of his contemporaries—Warren and Brandeis. Rather than wondering about protecting the lives of the elite, he used pictures of impoverished people to
encourage voluntary social reform and to aggrandize his own career. Like some other Progressives around the turn of the twentieth
century, he had little faith in government reform efforts, thought
Christian charity more likely than public programs to solve problems, was more than willing to blame immigrants and the poor for
their often dispiriting plight, and found much to admire in Spenserian notions of natural selection.110 His public lectures were widely
attended and helped stimulate sales of How the Other Half Lives.
The book was a major best seller.111 Privacy was hardly on his mind.
He mentioned the idea only twice—once to observe how useless
108

Id.
The image, entitled “Lodgers in a Crowded Bayard Street Tenement,” taken by
Jacob Riis, is available in RIIS, supra note 104, at 57, and EXPOSED: VOYEURISM, supra note
103, at 30. It is also available online. See Jacob Riis: How the Other Half Lives,
APPROPRIATE(D) MOMENTS, http://www.rhchused.com/Moments12.html [http://perma.
cc/N3LQ-LWLV] (last visited Sept. 28, 2015)
110
See BONNIE YOCHELSON & DANIEL CZITROM, REDISCOVERING JACOB RIIS: EXPOSURE
JOURNALISM AND PHOTOGRAPHY IN TURN-OF-THE-CENTURY NEW YORK 106–15 (2007).
Though many Progressives were deeply interested in government reforms, there also was
a deep stream of opposition to government intervention among those claiming an interest
in the plight of the impoverished. I found the same train of thought when studying
landlord-tenant reforms at the turn of the twentieth century. See Richard Chused,
Impoverished Tenants in Twentieth Century America, in LANDLORD AND TENANT LAW:
PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 257–76 (Susan Bright ed., 2006).
111
YOCHELSON & CZITROM, supra note 110, at 160.
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the concept was in overcrowded tenements and the other to note in
a similar vein that having doors in living quarters might be helpful
in securing privacy.112 Any notion that he inappropriately intruded
into the lives of tenement dwellers was outside his frame of reference. He occupied a superior social place.
Riis’s views were typical of many, though certainly not all, early
twentieth-century Progressives. He described residents of Jewtown
in prose laden with the old canard about nefarious moneymaking:
[I]n presenting the home life of these people, I have
been at some pains to avoid the extreme of privation, taking the cases just as they came to hand on
the safer middle ground of average earnings. Yet
even the direst apparent poverty in Jewtown, unless
dependent on the absolute lack of work, would,
were the truth known, in nine cases out of ten have a
silver lining in the shape of margin in bank.113
Similarly, with the black poor, Riis expressed marginal antipathy for the most atrocious forms of oppression while leaving no
doubt about his lowly opinion of the race:
Natural selection will have more or less to do
beyond a doubt in every age with dividing the races;
only so, it may be, can they work out together their
highest destiny. But with the despotism that deliberately assigns to the defenseless Black the lowest
level for the purpose of robbing him there that has
nothing to do. Of such slavery, different only in degree from the other kind that held him as chattel, to
be sold or bartered at the will of his master, this century, if signs fail not, will see the end in New
York.114
By the time James Agee and Walker Evans published the classic
book Let Us Now Praise Famous Men half a century later, the authors expressed, though did not act upon, quite different notions
about the significance of private spaces and intimate photogra112
113
114

RIIS, supra note 104, at 133, 159.
Id. at 148–49.
Id. at 133.
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phy.115 In 1936, they agreed to do a project for Fortune Magazine on
“cotton tenantry in the United States, in the form of a photographic and verbal record of the daily living and environment of an average white family of tenant farmers.”116 Though the magazine
project never saw the light of day,117 it led to publication of the book
five years later. The opening lines of the volume revealed a distinctly different mindset from that of Riis. Agee began his powerful
exploration of impoverished farmers with an agonizing appraisal of
his own role:
It seems to me curious, not to say obscene and thoroughly terrifying, that it could occur to an association of human beings drawn together through need
and chance and for profit into a company, an organ
of journalism, to pry intimately into the lives of an
undefended and appallingly damaged group of human beings, an ignorant and helpless rural family,
for the purpose of parading the nakedness, disadvantage and humiliation of these lives before another group of human beings, in the name of science, of
“honest journalism” (whatever that paradox may
mean), of humanity, of social fearlessness, for money, and for a reputation for crusading and for unbias,
which, when skillfully enough qualified, is exchangeable at any bank for money (and in politics, for
votes, job patronage, abelincolnism, etc.); and that
these people could be capable of meditating this
prospect without the slightest doubt of their qualification to do an “honest” piece of work, and with a
conscious better than clear, and in the virtual certitude of almost unanimous public approval.118
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See BELINDA RATHBONE, WALKER EVANS: A BIOGRAPHY 118–38 (1995) for a full
telling of the development of the project.
116
AGEE & EVANS, supra note 105, at ix.
117
Copies of the original manuscript that was never published have now been found and
published. Christine Haughney, A Paean to Forbearance (the Rough Draft), N.Y. TIMES,
June 3, 2013, at C1.
118
AGEE & EVANS, supra note 105, at 7.

136

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.[Vol. XXVI:103

The deep respect Agee and Evans felt for members of the three
families they befriended in Alabama is starkly evident in the regal
qualities of the faces Evans captured and the artful way he composed shots of rooms and locations empty of people.119★ It also is
palpable in the way Agee described their movements as Evans took
pictures when the houses were empty:
No one is at home, in all this house, in all this
land. It is a long while before their return. I shall
move as they would trust me not to, and as I could
not, were they here. I shall touch nothing but as I
would touch the most delicate wounds, the most
dedicated objects.
The silence of the brightness of this middle
morning is increased upon me moment by moment
and upon this house, and upon this house the whole
of heaven is drawn into one lens; and this house itself, in each of its objects, it, too, is one lens.
I am being made witness to matters no human
being may see.
There is a cold beating at my solar plexus. I
move in exceeding slowness and silence that I shall
not dishonor nor awaken this house: and in every instant of silence, it becomes more entirely perfected
upon itself under the sun.120
The very artistry of Agee’s prose mirrors the deep tensions he
and Evans felt as they completed their invasive project. Their concerns and internal conflicts were motivated both by an understand119★

Two examples are posted online at Richard H. Chused, Agee and Walker,
APPROPRIATE(D) MOMENTS, http://www.rhchused.com/Moments13.html [http://perma.cc/
XD6V-LJQT] (last visited Sept. 28, 2015). Both were taken by Evans when he was under
contract with the Farm Security Administration as part of a number of New Deal
programs to support the arts and develop support for reform programs. The photos are
government documents now in the collection of the Library of Congress. The picture of
Allie Mae Burroughs is available online. See Allie Mae Burroughs, Wife of a Cotton
Sharecropper. Hale County, Alabama, LIB. OF CONG., http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/
fsa1998020949/PP [http://perma.cc/5TS4-GV76] (last visited Sept. 28, 2015); Corner of
Kitchen in Floyd Burroughs’ Cabin. Hale County, Alabama, LIB. OF CONG., http://www.loc
.gov/pictures/item/fsa1998020949/PP [http://perma.cc/YXH7-VEZK] (last visited
Sept. 28, 2015).
120
AGEE & EVANS, supra note 105, at 135–36.
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ing of the intrusive nature of their work and by deep respect for the
strength of the poor families they befriended. But, of course, Evans
went ahead and took the pictures. They also “explored bureau
drawers, storage trunks, kitchen cupboards, and closets, making a
thorough inventory of their contents.”121 Perhaps this was a concession to the importance of the political contours of their work. Or
maybe Evans and Agee felt free to go ahead because they obtained
some level of consent from the families they imposed upon. They
did, however, carry guilt with them as they left Alabama and headed back to New York:
When they finally made their departure . . . Agee
and Evans felt as much guilt as they had setting out.
But now their guilt was real rather than simply anticipated. They knew that what they had done
would not really change the families’ lives for the
better, and they knew that the families were under
the innocent impression that it would.122
The notion that Agee and Evans could help the locals obtain
government assistance was left intact, both while the project was
documented and after it ended. In any case, the book received
mixed reviews and did not sell well.123 But, when the volume was
condemned in reviews, it was not Evans’ images that evoked dyspepsia; rather, it was Agee’s sometimes unfathomable prose that
left critical readers at sea.124
Not long after Evans took the photographs used in Let Us Now
Praise Famous Men, he began another project taking pictures with a
hidden camera of riders on the New York City subways. He was far
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RATHBONE, supra note 115, at 129.
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See Malcolm Jones, Revisiting James Agee: Discovering the Original “Let Us Now
Praise Famous Men,” DAILY BEAST (June 7, 2013, 3:25 PM), http://www.thedaily
beast.com/articles/2013/06/07/revisiting-james-agee-discovering-the-original-let-usnow-praise-famous-men.html [http://perma.cc/A6RC-WW7A].
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See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE ESSAY 16–18 (Tracy Chevalier ed., 1977). For a conflicted
review, see the 1941 essay of Whittaker Chambers, Books: Experiment in Communication,
TIME (Oct. 13, 1941), http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,766271,
00.html [http://perma.cc/HUD8-SSHD].
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from the only person doing it.125 Evans’ images, however, were not
published until Many Are Called was released in 1966. Before the
book appeared, Evans claimed that the twenty-five year interval
between creating the images and their release was due to his concern about reactions from those portrayed in the pictures. In Harper’s Bazaar, however, he admitted for the first time,
[T]he portraits on these pages were caught by a hidden camera, in the hands of a penitent spy and apologetic voyeur. But the rude and impudent invasion
involved has been carefully softened and partially
mitigated by a planned passage of time. These pictures were made twenty years ago, and deliberately
preserved from publication.126
But, as Jeff Rosenheim was careful to note, the delay may have
been due as much to Evans’ difficulty in finding a publisher, as it
was to concern about the feelings of those pictured.127 Furthermore, eight of the pictures were published in 1956.128 Luc Sante, in
his foreword to the 2004 edition of the book, doubted that the delay was due to any fear of litigation.129
Twenty-five years passed between the completion of this book
and its original publication. Although folklore has it that Walker
Evans feared lawsuits from his unwitting subjects, the times were
nowhere near as litigious as ours. Furthermore, Evans had been
photographing people on the street, many of them unaware, for
well over a decade by then, and he also knew that photographers
from Paul Strand to Helen Levitt, who often sat beside him on the
subway as his assistant and decoy, had taken surreptitious street
pictures with a periscopic lens, and nobody had ever gone after
125

See TRACY FITZPATRICK, ART AND THE SUBWAY: NEW YORK UNDERGROUND 117–31
(2009). These surreptitiously-taken pictures can be usefully compared to the use of
portraits taken with consent. See, e.g., Corey Kilgallon, The Faces on the Ferry, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 1, 2015, at MB9. This is an article about pictures taken by Marcus Trappaud
Bjorn, a Danish photographer, on the Staten Island Ferry. Bjorn’s images are quite good,
though they lack the spontaneity, informality and compositional qualities of spur of the
moment photography.
126
Jeff L. Rosenheim, Afterword, in EVANS, supra note 106, at 203–04.
127
Id.
128
Id. at 202.
129
Luc Sante, Foreward, in EVANS, supra note 106.
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them when the results were exhibited or published. It is unlikely
that Evans would have felt he needed to protect himself from possible retribution, but on the other hand he may well have been apprehensive about how his subject might react emotionally.130
And that’s the rub. Even if Evans empathized with the feelings
of those whose pictures he secretly took, that did not translate into
declining to snap the pictures or later publish them. Concern about
privacy was “in the air” but not determinative of his or others’ artistic actions.
While Riis, Agee, and Evans were among the most famous
American surveillance photographers of the first half of the twentieth century, they had many other well-known contemporary and
successor colleagues. Lewis Hine took pictures of child laborers in
mines without the knowledge of the mine owners; Paul Strand, Alfred Stieglitz, Ben Shahn, Helen Levitt, Henri Cartier-Bresson,
Arthur Fellig, and Diane Arbus all took pictures without consent.131
And, of course, there is the famous dispute over Frederick Wiseman’s 1967 documentary film Titicut Follies—a devastating portrait
of the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Bridgewater.132
“Insane persons charged with crime and defective delinquents”
were committed to the facility.133 Wiseman obtained oral permission from the state’s Commissioner of Correction and the Attorney
General to film operations at the institution.134 The terms of the
understanding became the subject of much disagreement after then
Massachusetts Attorney General Elliot Richardson concluded that
they had been violated and that the privacy rights of the institution’s inmates breached. Scenes in the film are quite stark and challenging to watch—preparation of a suicide victim’s body for burial,
130

Id. at 11.
Their careers are briefly sketched in Sandra Phillips, The Unseen Photographer, in
EXPOSED: VOYEURISM, supra note 103, at 20–23.
132
FREDERICK WISEMAN, TITICUT FOLLIES (1967). Wiseman may be the most famous
documentary filmmaker of twentieth-century America. He has made dozens of films. In
each, he displays people moving, speaking and working in an institution or place, edits the
film, and presents it without any narration. The subjects of each film he makes quite
literally speak for themselves. Movies and videos were not part of the Tate/San Francisco
Modern exhibition, but it would be a striking omission in an essay like this to ignore
Wiseman’s activities.
133
Commonwealth v. Wiseman, 249 N.E.2d 610, 612 (Mass. 1969).
134
Id. at 612–13.
131
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forced feedings, masturbation, nude inmates confined in their cells,
and strip searches, among others. After a trial court enjoined all
showings of the film, the Massachusetts Supreme Court modified
the injunction to permit educational performances “to legislators,
judges, lawyers, sociologists, social workers, doctors, psychiatrists,
students in these or related fields, and organizations dealing with
the social problems of custodial care and mental infirmity.”135 The
court expressed deep concern about the vagueness of the permission granted to Wiseman, the inability of many inmates to agree to
their filming, and the failure to obtain consent from many of those
filmed.136
Though Wiseman and others have claimed that the First
Amendment prevents Massachusetts from limiting use of the film,
it is easy to understand why its display was constrained. Despite
the fact that it led to significant changes in the way we treat those
confined because of mental limitations, the extent of its intrusion
into the lives of the inmates was stunning. But for purposes of this
Article, the most interesting happening is not the partial banning of
the film in the late 1960s, but its release for general use in 1991.
Though he previously viewed the film as an egregious intrusion
into the lives of Bridgewater’s inmates and was responsible for issuing the initial injunction against its display, Judge Andrew Gill
Meyer concluded that a “quarter century has passed since the film
was made” and that “no evidence of harm to any individual” resulted from its showings.137 This denouement echoes the belated
publication of Walker Evans’ subway pictures—acceding to the
realities of the passage of time. The fate of Wiseman’s film was a
symbol not only of the somewhat heightened cultural awareness of
privacy issues during the 1960s, but also the fading impact of intrusion as time passes.

135

Id. at 618. For a brief summary of the judicial history of the dispute, see Comment,
The “Titicut Follies” Case: Limiting the Public Interest Privilege, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 359
(1970).
136
Wiseman, 249 N.E.2d at 616–17.
137
Paul Langner, Last Curb on ‘Titicut Follies’ is Lifted, 24 Years After Ban, BOS. GLOBE,
Aug. 2, 1991. The judge did, however, require that the names and addresses of people
shown in the film remain confidential. Id.

2015]

APPROPRIATE(D) MOMENTS

141

In an affidavit accompanying his motion to dismiss the Fosters’
claims, Arne Svenson noted other more recent photographers have
followed in the footsteps of Riis, Agee, and Evans.138 For purposes
of this Article, the most pertinent artists he noted were Michael
Wolf and Michelle Iverson.139 Wolf’s 2008 book, The Transparent
City, commissioned by the Museum of Contemporary Photography
in Chicago, contained an array of color pictures taken with a telephoto lens in Chicago.140 Wolf, whose work is in the Metropolitan
Museum of Art among other important institutions,141 captured
people at home and at work. He began by taking images of large
buildings in downtown Chicago from high open-air vantage points.
He then blew up pictures—sometimes hundreds of times—of entire structures and discovered images not visible when he snapped
the shots. Though they became pixelated, images of people in various forms of apparent concern, distress, boredom, and partial nudity emerged. Examples, available on his website, include one of a
man standing in his office and another of a pixelated woman’s face
in apparent distress.142 Wolf’s pictures, like Svenson’s, generated
some controversy,143 though no litigation was filed.

138
Supplemental Affidavit of Arne Svenson ¶¶ 6–10, Foster v. Svenson, No.
651826/2013, 2013 WL 3989038 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 5, 2013).
139
Svenson also referred to the work of Mitchell Epstein. See Supplemental Affidavit of
Arne Svenson, supra note 138, ¶ 8 (referring to Epstein’s City series); see also The City,
MITCHELL EPSTEIN, http://mitchepstein.net/work/city/index.html [http://perma.cc/
2B3K-CK64] (last visited Sept. 28, 2015).
140
MICHAEL WOLF, THE TRANSPARENT CITY (2008).
141
One of his pieces is in the Metropolitan collection online. See The Online Collection,
METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART, http://www.metmuseum.org/collection/thecollection-online/search/287975?rpp=30&pg=1&ft=michael+wolf&pos=1 [http://perma.
cc/PET8-ZWEZ] (last visited Sept. 28, 2015). For a list of other museum collections, see
Biography, MICHAEL WOLF, http://photomichaelwolf.com/#biography [http://perma.cc/
9XDF-SFK6] (last visited Dec. 21, 2015).
142
See Transparent City Detail #7, MICHAEL WOLF, http://photomichaelwolf.com/
#transparent-city-details/7 [http://perma.cc/49NN-GBW4] (last visited Sept. 28, 2015);
Transparent City #32, MICHAEL WOLF, http://photomichaelwolf.com/#transparentcity/10 [http://perma.cc/BQC9-HAY2] (last visited Dec. 21, 2015). I have elected not to
show pictures by either Wolf or Iverson even though it really is not possible to sense the
nature of their work without looking at the images.
143
See, e.g., James Estrin, Showcase: Life Behind Glass, N.Y. TIMES: LENS (July 2, 2009),
http://lens.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/02/showcase-14/
[http://perma.cc/9FKCDUR3].
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Many of the black and white pictures in Michele Iversen’s
Night Surveillance Series display people’s faces and lives in much
more revealing and perhaps disturbing ways than in Svenson’s.144
She drove at night to various residential neighborhoods, parked in
front of houses and waited with her camera for events to unfold.
Her webpage has an artist’s statement that would clearly upset the
Foster family. It reads:
Night Surveillance Series
As a photographer, I choose to reveal aspects of
human nature that were previously hidden from
view. These unknown images are constructed from
real life. I use the camera as a tool to objectively
document and create intimate discoveries through
both systematic and chance shooting.
In the Night Surveillance Series, I have cautiously
and randomly photographed people inside of their
homes through windows . . . witnessing curious behaviors. Surveillance is an important element for
me. I fearfully wait for an image to record, and to
steal the privacy of the subject separated only by a
window of glass. These images are motivated by
fear. I am afraid to be seen, afraid to watch at the
very same moment I determine when to suspend a
stranger’s privacy. I feel stimulation from the violation imposed upon the unknowingly compliant subjects. An intense aesthetic/erotic friction occurs.
144

See Night Surveillance Series, MICHELE IVERSON, http://micheleiversen.com/
nsseries.html [http://perma.cc/8CCH-HK9H] (last visited Sept. 29, 2015). See, for
example, a scene of three women talking in a kitchen—Untitled No. 31 (Pasadena, CA
1995). According to Svenson’s affidavit, Iverson has been working on this series since
1995. See Supplemental Affidavit of Arne Svenson, supra note 138, ¶ 9. She also has
received a grant from the New York State Foundation for the Arts. An even more
revealing mental image of Iverson is presented in a monologue she gave on a radio show.
It is available on Studio 360 in a story created by Jonathan Mitchell that was originally
aired on December 17, 2010. The excerpt with Iverson speaking is part of an hour-long
program. See Jonathan Mitchell, She Sees Your Every Move, STUDIO 360 (Oct. 7, 2011),
http://www.studio360.org/story/162548-she-sees-your-every-move [http://perma.cc/6B
BF-2UAG]; see also Kurt Anderson, Surveillance, STUDIO 360 (Dec. 17, 2010),
http://www.studio360.org/story/108704-surveillance
[http://perma.cc/NRZ2-639D]
(containing the full program on surveillance technology).
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However, I am compelled to make these images and
to expose the voyeuristic tendencies inherent in
human culture.
The photographs measure 40” x 48”. They are
intimate and anonymous, familiar and uncomfortable, while at the same time the viewer is complicit
with the voyeurism conveyed by each image.145
There is therefore little doubt that Svenson’s work is part of a
significant genre of highly regarded photography and filmmaking.
Many major galleries and museums in addition to the Tate London
and the San Francisco Museum of Modern Art have devoted significant space and resources for exhibitions of this kind of work.
Barring the display of Svenson’s images risks delegitimizing an artistic movement of some importance. There is, therefore, a dramatic tension between the artistic preferences of photographers like
Wolf, Iverson, and Svenson and the privacy concerns of the Fosters.
III. THE LEGAL JOURNEY
The Foster/Svenson case does not fit comfortably within the
present structure of privacy law. Traditional rationales for creating
privacy torts don’t accurately speak to the dispute. The tensions
between the artistic and cultural intentions of photographers and
the preferences of imaged subjects fall outside the ways we normally think about this legal arena. An additional layer of dissonance has
arisen with the arrival in the last two decades of digital photography, easy image manipulation, and vast online distribution systems.
For this part of the inquiry, I first will investigate traditional privacy tort norms to see why they do not provide an appropriate way to
resolve the Foster dispute. Second, with the help of others who
have written in the field, I’ll take a stab at constructing a new way
of thinking about the case.

145

Night Surveillance Series, supra note 144.
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A. Traditional Privacy Tort Law
Commonly discussed rubrics for thinking about and describing
privacy intrusions don’t work well in the dispute between the Fosters and Svenson. They are either inapplicable to or unsuitable for
use. Common law theories of privacy rights—largely derived from
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, written in 1977—are very difficult to apply in this circumstance. The rules about intrusive privacy
violations require quite offensive behavior, particularly at the place
or moment of the intrusion146—a major obstacle for the Fosters.
Little attention is paid to the post-intrusion life of any images obtained147—a crucial oversight in our digital world. Trespass, in the
absence of a dramatic shift to a theory not based on physical incursions, is simply inapplicable.148 The recent development of publicity rights, often described as an aspect of privacy, is widespread. But
the general rule barring nonconsensual use of a person’s name,
likeness or voice for commercial purposes does not fit the Foster
situation. The Restatement guidelines may provide protection
against highly offensive physical or electronic intrusions, unreasonable public disclosure of private information or intentional revelation of facts placing a person in a false light, but they generally
don’t cover a situation like the surreptitious taking of pictures
through open windows.149 Privacy in the constitutional sense, and
especially the now commonplace phrase “expectation of privacy,”
is particularly difficult to fathom in settings where people are openly visible to the world and the invading party is private rather than
governmental.
Traditional privacy tort law defines a narrow set of wrongs.150
Since William Prosser penned his famous article, Privacy, in
146

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
Id. In the language of the rule, the tort arises from the “intrusion,” not the later
consequences flowing from distribution of images.
148
In the Foster case, there was no physical intrusion. Relief was possible only if the
standard definition of “trespass” was expanded to include the use of cameras to obtain
images of areas normally accessible only to someone present in the space.
149
New York, where the Foster dispute arose, generally does not provide relief for any
privacy violations that fall outside of the “right of publicity” rubric. See N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS
LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 2014); see also discussion infra note 154.
150
The literature is enormous. A good starting point for the uninitiated is Richards &
Solove, supra note 22. A longer version of Solove’s ideas is available in SOLOVE, supra
note 83.
147
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1960,151 courts generally have given credence to the four categories
of harms he described.
(1)
Intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or
solitude, or into his private affairs.
(2)
Public disclosure of embarrassing private
facts about the plaintiff.
(3)
Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false
light in the public eye.
(4)
Appropriation,
for
the
defendant’s
advantage, of the plaintiff’s name or
likeness.152
This basic structure was copied by the authors of the Second
Restatement.153 The Fosters are unlikely to gain much solace from
151

See Prosser, supra note 22, at 383.
Id. at 389. Though intentional infliction of emotional distress often touches on
privacy issues, it was never included in Prosser’s structure. See Richards & Solove, supra
note 22, at 1907–09.
153
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (AM. LAW INST. 1977). Prosser
served as the Reporter for the Restatement (Second) of Torts, so it is hardly surprising
that his views of privacy resurfaced. Though he died in 1972 before the new version was
published, it emerged virtually unchanged. The privacy provisions are as follows:
652A. General Principle
(1) One who invades the right of privacy of another is subject to
liability for the resulting harm to the interests of the other.
(2) The right of privacy is invaded by:
(a) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another, as
stated in 652B; or
(b) appropriation of the other’s name or likeness, as stated
in 652C; or
(c) unreasonable publicity given to the other’s private life,
as stated in 652D; or
(d) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false
light before the public, as stated in 652E.
652B. Intrusion upon Seclusion
One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon
the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or
concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his
privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person.
652C. Appropriation of Name or Likeness
One who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or
likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion
of his privacy.
652D. Publicity Given to Private Life
152
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this taxonomy, not simply because New York is one of the states
that does not recognize a common law privacy tort,154 but because
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of
another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his
privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that
(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and
(b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.
652E. Publicity Placing Person in False Light
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that
places the other before the public in a false light is subject to
liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if
(a) the false light in which the other was placed would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person, and
(b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless
disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the
false light in which the other would be placed.
Id. §§ 652A–E.
154
See N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 2009). While there are statutory
provisions that were adopted in 1903, they deal mostly with right of publicity claims. The
pertinent text of these provisions follows:
Section 50 – Right of privacy
A person, firm or corporation that uses for advertising purposes,
or for the purposes of trade, the name, portrait or picture of any
living person without having first obtained the written consent of
such person, or if a minor of his or her parent or guardian, is
guilty of a misdemeanor.
Section 51 – Action for injunction and for damages
Any person whose name, portrait, picture or voice is used within
this state for advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade
without the written consent first obtained as above provided may
maintain an equitable action in the supreme court of this state
against the person, firm or corporation so using his name,
portrait, picture or voice, to prevent and restrain the use thereof;
and may also sue and recover damages for any injuries sustained
by reason of such use and if the defendant shall have knowingly
used such person’s name, portrait, picture or voice in such
manner as is forbidden or declared to be unlawful by section fifty
of this article, the jury, in its discretion, may award exemplary
damages. But nothing contained in this article shall be so
construed as to prevent any person, firm or corporation from
selling or otherwise transferring any material containing such
name, portrait, picture or voice in whatever medium to any user
of such name, portrait, picture or voice, or to any third party for
sale or transfer directly or indirectly to such a user, for use in a
manner lawful under this article; nothing contained in this article
shall be so construed as to prevent any person, firm or
corporation, practicing the profession of photography, from
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the standards themselves are likely to be unavailing.155 The Restatement (Second) of Torts section 652B’s unlawful intrusion
exhibiting in or about his or its establishment specimens of the
work of such establishment, unless the same is continued by
such person, firm or corporation after written notice objecting
thereto has been given by the person portrayed; and nothing
contained in this article shall be so construed as to prevent any
person, firm or corporation from using the name, portrait,
picture or voice of any manufacturer or dealer in connection
with the goods, wares and merchandise manufactured, produced
or dealt in by him which he has sold or disposed of with such
name, portrait, picture or voice used in connection therewith . . .
.Nothing contained in the foregoing sentence shall be deemed to
abrogate or otherwise limit any rights or remedies otherwise
conferred by federal law or state law.
Id. §§ 50-51
New York courts have consistently refused to allow expansion of these provisions to
cover the taking and sale of pictures unattached to the marketing of a separate product.
Plaintiffs must show that their picture was used for purposes of advertising or trade
without consent. Under this standard, non-consensual use of an image to promote a
product is one thing. Sale of the image itself is another. Therefore, a person whose name,
address, date of birth, and social security number were published by a daily newspaper
along with information concerning involvement in an illegal sports gambling operation,
could not recover because the information was published by defendant in a newsworthy
article and was not used for advertising or trade purposes. See, e.g., Valeriano v. Rome
Sentinel Co., 43 A.D.3d 1357 (N.Y. 2007).
Similarly, an artist may make a work of art that includes a recognizable likeness of
person without consent and sell copies without violating privacy statutes, see Simeonov v.
Tiegs, 159 Misc.2d 54 (N.Y. 1993), use the identity of a person in a work of fiction, see
Costanza v. Seinfeld, 279 A.D.2d 255 (N.Y. 2001), or use a photo in a book on nude
beaches with the recognizable image of a person who was present at the time, see Creel v.
Crown Publishing, Inc., 115 A.D.2d 414 (N.Y. 1985). These disputes should be contrasted
with Cohen v. Herbal Concepts, Inc., 63 N.Y.2d 379 (1984), where a surreptitiously taken
picture of a mother and her child bathing nude in a stream was later used without
permission in an ad for a product claiming to get rid of cellulite. The picture was from the
side and did not show faces, but was remanded for trial on whether the plaintiffs were
recognizable. Putting aside the privacy intrusion issues at stake in this Article, the
limitation on publicity right claims makes some sense. Many photographs of people are
taken both without consent and without serious concerns about privacy. The sales of such
images should not raise publicity rights problems.
155
A fairly recent, tragic case is a perfect example of both the unwillingness of the New
York courts to allow common law privacy claims and the difficulties of meeting the
traditionally defined privacy intrusion standard about to be described in the text. N.Y.
Med, an ABC-TV series, broadcast a recording made in the New York-Presbyterian
Hospital emergency room of the futile efforts to save the life of a man hit by a garbage
truck. For more details, see Charles Ornstein, Dying in the E. R., and on TV, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 4, 2014, at MB1. Neither the dying man, Mark Chanko, nor any member of his family
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standard—the most relevant to the Fosters—provides, “One who
intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or
seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to
liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.”156 The commentary indicates clearly that the interest protected is “solitude or seclusion,” that publicizing the results of the intrusion is not a prerequisite to suit,157 and that the intrusion need not be physical.158
While the standard seems applicable, the requirement that the intrusion be highly offensive to a reasonable person is a major stumbling block. The cases providing some form of relief typically involve obvious intrusions, such as divorce disputes where one soonto-be ex-partner plants listening or video devices in the home of the
other or disputes between neighbors involving long-term surveillance.159 The examples in the Restatement commentary typically
have either a dramatic quality about them—a hospital picture taken
consented to the recording of the hospital scenes or their later broadcast. No identifying
information about the patient was revealed though he was visible with a pixelated face
during the broadcast. The family sued the hospital, doctor, and TV network. Their
privacy intrusion claims were dismissed. The trial court allowed an intentional infliction
of emotional distress cause of action to go forward against the network, but that was
reversed on appeal. The Appellate Division concluded that the imposition upon Mark
Chanko’s family when they saw the episode without any knowledge of its impending
broadcast “was not so extreme and outrageous as to support a claim” for emotional
distress. Chanko v. American Broadcasting Co., Inc., 122 A.D.3d 487 (N.Y. 2014). That
limitation on emotional distress claims is quite similar to the traditional privacy intrusion
rule requiring that the invasion must be highly objectionable to a reasonable person. It is
very difficult to justify the Chanko result.
156
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B.
157
Id. § 652B cmt. a:
The form of invasion of privacy covered by this Section does not
depend upon any publicity given to the person whose interest is
invaded or to his affairs. It consists solely of an intentional
interference with his interest in solitude or seclusion, either as to his
person or as to his private affairs or concerns, of a kind that would be
highly offensive to a reasonable man.
158
Id. § 652B cmt. b:
The invasion may be by physical intrusion into a place in which the
defendant has secluded himself . . . . It may also be by the use of the
defendant’s senses, with or without mechanical aids, to oversee or
overhear the plaintiff’s private affairs . . . . It may be by some other
form of investigation or examination into his private concerns . . . .
159
See, e.g., Polay v. McMahon, 10 N.E.2d 1122 (Mass. 2014); In re Marriage of Tigges,
758 N.W.2d 824 (Iowa 2008).
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after being told to leave160—or a quality of persistence and stubbornness by the intruder—intimate picturetaking over a period of
time.161 In addition, public spaces, or perhaps spaces left visible to
those in other places, are not environments conducive to privacy
lawsuits.162
While it is possible that these norms might be met in the Foster
setting, it is a very steep hill to climb. There are a series of significant problems and potentially illogical limitations on the claim.
First, there is no evidence that Svenson took pictures over a long
period of time. Second, Svenson took pictures of a variety of
apartments in addition to that of the Fosters. Only two of the images in The Neighbors exhibition involved their abode.163 He was not
particularly obsessed with them. Third, all the pictures in the exhibition involved views through windows totally or significantly un160

One example reads,
A, a woman, is sick in a hospital with a rare disease that arouses
public curiosity. B, a newspaper reporter, calls her on the telephone
and asks for an interview, but she refuses to see him. B then goes to
the hospital, enters A’s room and over her objection takes her
photograph. B has invaded A’s privacy.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. b, illus. 1.
161
Another example tells this little story: “A, a private detective seeking evidence for
use in a lawsuit, rents a room in a house adjoining B’s residence, and for two weeks looks
into the windows of B’s upstairs bedroom through a telescope taking intimate pictures
with a telescopic lens. A has invaded B’s privacy.” Id. § 652 cmt. b, illus. 2.
Life imitates Restatement examples. See Terrence McCoy, Penn State Frat Boys Sure
Enjoyed Posting Facebook Pics of Passed Out, Nude Women, WASH. POST (Mar. 18, 2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/03/18/what-penn-statefrat-brothers-said-while-posting-pics-of-passed-out-nude-women [http://perma.cc/GZS3HJEM]. This article describes one of a spate of recent fraternity scandals. Or recall the
incredible incident of a Modern Orthodox rabbi hiding a video device in a mikva (ritual
purification bath) in a synagogue. See Michael Paulson, Prominent Rabbi Arrested on a
Charge of Voyeurism, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2014, at A26.
162
That doesn’t mean controversy is lacking. Street photography, now a common
artistic endeavor, does not pass unnoticed. Bruce Gilden is certainly one of the most
talked about and sometimes disliked practitioners of the genre. For commentary on his
work from a fellow traveler and blogger, see Erik Kim, Bruce Gilden: Asshole or Genius,
ERIC KIM PHOTOGRAPHY BLOG (June 24, 2011), http://erickimphotography.com/blog/
2011/06/24/bruce-gilden-asshole-or-genius [http://perma.cc/9VXT-ZUBT]. Or you can
visit Gilden’s website and make up your own mind. BRUCE GILDEN, http://www.
brucegilden.com [http://perma.cc/5UUF-UDDU] (last visited Sept. 28, 2015).
163
It is possible he has more pictures that have not been publicly displayed, but I have
no way of obtaining information about that at the moment.
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obstructed by curtains or blinds. The occupants, in a sense, allowed
others to view them and perhaps therefore waived any intrusion
claims. Fourth, as far as I can tell, all but one of the images in the
exhibition was of living spaces, not bedrooms. These were not
places where Svenson would have expected people to disrobe while
leaving their shades up. And finally, Svenson’s intention was not
malicious, unkind, or prurient. His goals were artistic. In short,
there is a strong basis for concluding that the traditional privacy
intrusion rules do not cover this case—that they would not be
deemed “highly offensive to a reasonable person.”164 When
merged with the focus on the moment of intrusion rather than the
range of impacts—before, during and after the intrusion—the doctrine artificially limits the factors that may be taken into account.
For quite similar reasons, traditional ideas about physical intrusions into property aren’t helpful. It is obvious that prying human
eyes, whether looking through a camera lens or not, do not trespass
on the place being viewed. And, of course, eyes and the cameras in
front of them are now the least of our problems. Technology has
made it possible to discern much about what goes on inside buildings without either physically entering them or using our eyes to
discern activity. Heat detectors can peer through walls and sound
receivers can amplify faint noises emanating from many types of
places.165 Roving cameras in cars, robots, drones, and satellites turn
Google Maps and other systems into unreal ways of viewing the
world’s features—large and small alike. Indeed, the happenstance
ways people and homes are imaged as Google’s cameras scour the
world raises issues related to those under discussion here.166
But even if you wished to dramatically reconstruct the idea of
trespass to include sensory intrusions into homes by the use of
cameras, listening devices, heat detectors or other (perhaps not yet
invented) contraptions, there is no obvious way to categorize which
164

This is the standard norm found in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 652B.
See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (involving the use of detection
devices without a warrant, the Supreme Court disallowed use of the evidence obtained
without a warrant); Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473 (2014) (barring the routine search
of cell phone contents after a stop or an arrest without a warrant).
166
For a review of some of the issues, see Roger C. Geissler, Private Eyes Watching You:
Google Street View and the Right to an Inviolate Personality, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 897 (2012).
165
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sensory intrusions should be deemed unlawful. Attempting to do so
only recreates the dilemmas presented by the dispute between the
Fosters and Svenson. Some intrusions may be perfectly acceptable;
others may not. The presence or non-presence of a particular intrusive device does not resolve the problem. In addition, the requirement that the invasion be highly offensive is a significant and
perhaps irrational standard in a world filled with barely obvious or
subtle ways of gaining access to the intimate lives of others.
Nor do standard notions of commercial exploitation embedded
in doctrines like publicity rights resolve the problems. The core of
publicity rights attacks the use of a well-known person’s name or
likeness to endorse or sell a product—using a famous name as a
product moniker or a well-known person’s likeness in an advertisement without obtaining consent. So courts have barred Christian Dior from using Barbara Reynolds—a Jackie Onassis lookalike—in advertisements167★ and Ford Motor Company from hiring
Ula Hedwig—a one-time backup singer for Bette Midler—to
record a Midler staple with an amazingly good imitation of Midler’s voice in a TV spot for Mercury Sable automobiles.168 Though
the baseline rule makes sense as a way of deterring those who attempt to reap where they have not sown, it has too often been used

167★

Philip Shenon, Court Supports Mrs. Onassis on Ad, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 1984),
http://www.nytimes.com/1984/01/13/nyregion/court-supports-mrs-onassis-on-ad.html
[http://perma.cc/2ABX-NUSW]. A picture of the Dior advertisement can be found at
Richard H. Chused, Onassis Publicity Rights, APPROPRIATE(D) MOMENTS, http://www.
rhchused.com/Moments14.html [http://perma.cc/M4G6-FF5H] (last visited Sept. 28,
2015).
168
Midler v. Ford Motor Company, 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988). One of the ads is
available online. (Mostly) Fan Made Ford Ads, 2008 Mercury Sable Commercial,
YOUTUBE (Aug. 12, 2007), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YUiMiox0WP0 [http://
perma.cc/ZJV6-S2CZ]. The story is told in GENELLE BELMAS & WAYNE OVERBECK,
MAJOR PRINCIPLES OF MEDIA LAW 214 (2012). It’s worth comparing the Midler dispute
with Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F. 2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970). Here, too, the
advertiser had purchased the right to use the song, “These Boots Are Made For
Walking,” made famous by Nancy Sinatra, without obtaining the singer’s consent. But
the voice imitation, if you dare to call it that, did not sound much like Sinatra. Though
many people watching the ad certainly thought of Sinatra because of the music, it was
difficult to contend that her persona was used in the ad itself. In both Midler and Sinatra,
rights to use the music itself were purchased by the advertiser.
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well beyond any legitimate boundary line to crimp creativity and
public commentary.169
There are at least two justifications for the right of publicity.
First, use of a person’s image, a likeness of a person, a spot-on imitation, or the name of a person in a sales pitch connotes an endorsement of the product by the personality appearing or seeming
to appear in the pitch. That, of course, is the primary reason for
using a well-known person’s likeness in an ad—it helps sell products. But such non-consensual use can, at times, be pernicious.
Bette Midler, for example, has never agreed to participate in a
product advertisement.170 To undermine such a course of conduct
attacks one of the core values she adheres to in her business life.
Second, even if a personality does, from time to time, appear in
ads, those decisions presumably are made with consent and, typically, for compensation. Why should a company be able to obtain
the services of a well-known personage for free? Those who reap
where they have not sown typically are treated badly in business
tort jurisprudence. It is this commercial use standard—often a
stand-in for trademark—that is embodied most clearly in the New
York privacy statutes relied upon by the Fosters. But the state’s

169

There now are many examples of publicity rights “overreaching.” Two are enough
to make the point. One is the famous case of Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts Inc., 579 F.2d 215
(2d Cir. 1978), involving a poster of Elvis Presley released shortly after his death. The
successor in interest of Presley’s estate claimed control over the use of his fame, a
position supported by the court. There were two serious flaws with the result, putting
aside the issue of whether publicity rights should survive the death of the famous person.
First, copyright in the picture used in the poster was not held by Presley’s estate and the
photo was legitimately taken at a concert. Allowing publicity rights to control its use
should have been preempted under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2006). Second,
and most important, the poster was simply a picture of Presley. It was not used as a come
on to buy another item. That is not the sort of story normally governed by publicity rights.
Another, and arguably more egregious result, was White v. Samsung, 971 F.2d 1395 (9th
Cir. 1992). Vanna White, the letter turner on Wheel of Fortune, was made fun of in a
Samsung ad that had a woman of similar stature dressed up as a robot turning letters.
Though the parody of White was very funny, the court found its use in an ad a violation of
her publicity rights. Why humor was not permitted is hard to discern. White, after all,
really does play the part of a robot on Wheel of Fortune. The ad certainly cannot be taken
as an endorsement by White of Samsung products.
170
Terri Eileen Hilliard, Advertisers Beware: Bette Midler Doesn’t Want to Dance, 9 LOY.
L.A. ENT. L. REV. 43 (1989).
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courts have steadfastly held to a rule that a likeness must be used to
boost sales of a product other than the picture itself.171
That is a sensible result, for some secretly taken pictures create
no significant privacy intrusion problems, and others do. Creative
photographers and artists often should be allowed to shoot, draw,
paint, and then sell scenes with people in them—even recognizable
people—without seeking permission. The fact that one person
makes money by using the likeness of another person found in a
public place typically does not suffice by itself to support a suit
claiming violation of privacy or publicity rights. The well-known
photographer Jesse Kalisher, for example, is most proud of an image he took, reproduced online, of a woman he does not know
standing in front of the Mona Lisa.172★ Surely he is not barred from
selling this picture just because it features another person in a public space. Nor is marketing of the many pictures of people quietly
sitting in a room of paintings by Rothko—an artist renowned for
inducing contemplative, “private” viewing—barred. In fact, fascinating results appear if you do a Google image search using the
171

See N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 2009). The statute was adopted in
1903 in response to the public furor created by the decision in Roberson v. Rochester Folding
Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902). A picture of Abigail Roberson, not a well-known
personality, was used to advertise flour. Neither the picture nor its use was consensual.
Twenty-five thousand copies were displayed all over the state. The new Court of Appeals
refused to create a common law privacy or publicity rights theory to impose liability. A
contrary, and now famous, result was reached three years later in Georgia. Pavesich v. New
England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
172★
On his website he writes,
After a bit, I decided to step back from the crowd and just take in the
room. My camera, at this point, was hanging around my neck and I
was merely observing the ebb and flow of people. That’s when this
woman walked past me. I’m asked often . . . so for the record: I don’t
know who this woman is, I have never met her, never spoke to her,
and I did not ask her to walk in front of me. It just happened. Luckily,
I did notice her incredible resemblance to the famous painting, lifted
my camera and got off one shot. I like to joke that this picture should
put my kids through college . . . it is certainly one of the shots of
which I’m most proud. Oh, and if anyone knows who this woman is,
by all means, please tell me . . . .
Jesse Kalisher, Mona Lisa at the Mona Lisa (Oct. 8, 2008), http://www.kalisher.com/
photo_blog/?p=4 [http://perma.cc/ABL3-GNFP]. The image is also available at Richard
H. Chused, Kalisher Image, APPROPRIATE(D) MOMENTS, http://www.rhchused.com/
Moments15.html [http://perma.cc/C7ER-EH6T] (last visited Sept. 28, 2015).
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phrase “contemplating Rothko.”173★ Some of the pictures are both
beautiful and thought provoking.
While the pictures of the Fosters were for sale before they were
removed during the litigation,174 the images were not used to sell
another product. Nor did Svenson’s compositions imply in any
way that the Fosters or other residents of The Zinc were endorsing
commercial activity; quite the contrary was the case. And since the
Fosters were unknown figures, Svenson certainly was not reaping
where others had sown. Their “fame” was not a basis for sale of
any photographs. Only Svenson’s creative talents led people to buy
an image. If those sales are to be constrained in any way, it must be
for reasons other than the simple presence of an image of a human
being.
Finally, the notion that something called “privacy” involves
arenas where we have an expectation of non-intrusiveness doesn’t
help much for at least two groups of reasons—one involving the
settings in which the phrase typically is used, and the other arising
from the limitations now imposed on its use in a private law context. First, the phrase “expectation of privacy” most commonly
arises where a private party is attempting to use the Fourth
Amendment to the Constitution to constrain government action.175
173★

One site that pops up is a review of a 2012 Rothko exhibit at the Portland, Oregon
Museum of Art. The page contains a number of images of people looking at Rothkos,
including one displayed on my website, see Richard H. Chused, Contemplating Rothko,
MOMENTS,
http://www.rhchused.com/Moments16.html
APPROPRIATE(D)
[http://perma.cc/5U7G-4NV9] (last visited Sept. 28, 2015). See also Rothko: Portland Art
Museum, TRAVELMARX (June 25, 2012), http://blog.travelmarx.com/2012/06/rothkoportland-art-museum.html [http://perma.cc/J9XA-FCCC]. There also is a famous
Rothko
Chapel
in
Houston.
ROTHKO CHAPEL, http://rothkochapel.org
[http://perma.cc/9MG7-UZAQ] (last visited Sept. 28, 2015). An almost equally wellknown Rothko Room at the Philips Museum in Washington, D.C. with signs explicitly
requesting viewers to view the paintings in quiet contemplation. The Rothko Room,
PHILLIPS
COLLECTION,
http://www.phillipscollection.org/collection/rothko-room
[http://perma.cc/9DD6-XB68] (last visited Sept. 28, 2015).
174
Martha Foster claimed in an affidavit filed in the case that the pictures were for sale
for $5,000 to $7,500. Affidavit of Martha G. Foster in Support of Motion for Preliminary
Injunction ¶ 5, Foster v. Svenson, No. 651826/2013, 2013 WL 3989038 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Aug. 5, 2013).
175
Its first major incarnation was in Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). He concluded that protection flowed from two
conditions—“that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy
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It asks what parts of our environment should be free from unreasonable intrusion because we “expect” the government to stay
out.176 Police, for example, are allowed to peer into virtually any unobstructed place.177 It would be almost impossible, therefore, for
the Fosters to bar government use in a criminal case of a photograph taken through their window. Still, enforcement authorities
may not typically enter a private residence without good reasons or
a warrant.
A fairly recent example is Kyllo v. United States.178 The Supreme Court concluded that the warrantless use of a thermal detector to scan the inside of a home for possible use of lamps to grow
marijuana violated the Fourth Amendment.179 Justice Scalia wrote:
We have held that visual observation is no “search”
at all—perhaps in order to preserve somewhat more
intact our doctrine that warrantless searches are
presumptively unconstitutional. In assessing when a
search is not a search, we have applied somewhat in
reverse the principle first enunciated in Katz v.
United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967). Katz involved
eavesdropping by means of an electronic listening
device placed on the outside of a telephone booth—
a location not within the catalog (“persons, houses,
papers, and effects”) that the Fourth Amendment
protects against unreasonable searches. We held
that the Fourth Amendment nonetheless protected
Katz from the warrantless eavesdropping because
he “justifiably relied” upon the privacy of the telephone booth. As Justice Harlan’s oft-quoted concurrence described it, a Fourth Amendment search
occurs when the government violates a subjective
expectation of privacy that society recognizes as
and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
[objectively] ‘reasonable.’” Id. at 361.
176
See id.
177
See, e.g., Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 234–35, 239 (1986)
(holding that an aerial viewing of Dow facilities by environmental regulations was not a
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment).
178
533 U.S. 27 (2001).
179
Id. at 41.
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reasonable. We have subsequently applied this principle to hold that a Fourth Amendment search does
not occur—even when the explicitly protected location of a house is concerned—unless “the individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in
the object of the challenged search,” and “society
[is] willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable.” We have applied this test in holding that it is
not a search for the police to use a pen register at
the phone company to determine what numbers
were dialed in a private home, and we have applied
the test on two different occasions in holding that
aerial surveillance of private homes and surrounding
areas does not constitute a search.180
In reading passages like this, it is clear that the Court was concerned about overly constraining police enforcement actions. Expectations of privacy must be held not only by the party intruded
upon but also by society at large.181★ Though the rule’s wisdom is
subject to serious questions, it has long been understood that areas
open to sightlines or items held by third parties are not protected
by the Fourth Amendment.182 Once something is visible to anyone
180

Id. at 32–33. The same basic outcome may be gleaned from Bond v. United States, 529
U.S. 334 (2000) and Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989). In Bond, the Court suppressed
methamphetamine found in a soft bag. A Border Patrol Agent had squeezed the bag after
boarding a bus to check the immigration status of the riders, but lacked any reasons to
believe that Bond was carrying illegal substances. Bond, 529 U.S. at 338–39. On the other
hand, the use of a helicopter to perform exterior searches from a height of 400 feet was
approved in Riley. The helicopter search allowed a county sheriff to see into the interior
of a greenhouse. The information gained led to the issuance of a search warrant and the
arrest of Riley for growing marijuana. Riley, 488 U.S. at 451–52. Bond was said to be a case
about unlawful intrusion, and Riley about using information obtained from an
unobstructed view through windows.
181★
To test your sensibilities, look at a thermal image of the White House at Richard H.
Chused, Thermal Imaging, APPROPRIATE(D) MOMENTS, http://www.rhchused.com/
Moments17.html [http://perma.cc/A62R-Q3PK] (last visited Sept. 28, 2015). The
British Gas image was published in 2010. Suzanne Goldenberg, Barack Obama’s $5bn
Green Home Plan to Boost Economy Gets Off to a Slow Start, GUARDIAN (Feb. 19, 2010),
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2010/feb/19/weatherisation-energy-efficiencyus-recovery-plan [http://perma.cc/8UKC-EW6X].
182
For a recent, thought provoking, privacy driven assessment of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments to the United States Constitution, see Bryan Choi, For Whom the Data
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other than the rights claimant, it loses its constitutional protections.
These sorts of norms may not rationally be applied in the Foster/Svenson setting. The most obvious reason is that the privacy
expectation rubric itself has lost connection with reality. The way
the various branches of the government obtain personal information no longer allows for much, if any, expectation of privacy. The
rule allowing the government to use information or objects visible
to third parties, regardless of how they obtained it, places an
enormous realm of “private” information and data outside constitutional boundaries. The vast wealth of online data, all routinely
searchable by government authorities, makes a mockery of the idea
that our expectations about the ways “private” information should
be used by public authorities has any relationship to its actual use.
The widespread knowledge that the government routinely searches
a great deal of our supposedly private physical, electronic, and
psychic spaces makes any notion of privacy based on intrusion into
physical places or territories seem preposterous. But most importantly, the Foster/Svenson dispute does not involve any expectations
about the use or abuse of government power. It asks quite different
questions about human interactions outside the arenas of government security and enforcement authority. That is critically important, for sometimes, the government may justifiably intrude in ways
individuals may not, while in other instances, individuals may venture where the government is barred.183
Second, there are many parts of our lives that are routinely visible to the general public, but traditional civil privacy law does not
bar the media from using information once it is publicly available—
regardless of our expectations.184 The impact of that rule on the
Tolls: A Reunified Theory of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Jurisprudence, 37 CARDOZO L.
REV. 185 (2015).
183
For example, a police office may often stop a person on the street and seek
information, make an arrest or perform a search. Those not involved in law enforcement
may not take such steps. On the other hand, a spouse or parent typically may open any
closet in her or his residence, even if another occupant is the primary user of the space.
Police may not take such actions without quite specific permission or reasons. This
Article is not about government-citizen contacts, but citizen-citizen contacts.
184
The principle early case is Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975). The
Supreme Court concluded that the First Amendment barred providing an invasion of
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Fosters is not clear. Leaving the blinds up or curtains open in our
apartments doesn’t necessarily invite prying eyes to look, but it
doesn’t bar them either. Indeed, walking around New York at night
often is a visual delight for those who enjoy seeing how residents
have decorated or remodeled apartment interiors in the sometimes
nondescript buildings that line the city’s streets and avenues. We
have no pure privacy expectations from prying eyes in such settings, but we may still conclude—despite our open confession that
we often make the interiors of our abodes visible to those outside
our living spaces—that some distributions of photographs of our
home-based happenings is inappropriate. It is not that we have any
expectation that peering into a place is off limits to third parties,
but rather that we might reasonably hope to limit the ways such
peering may be used. It is not just, or even, the intrusion that is at
issue. It is the entire context surrounding what people do with their
ability to appropriate moments in other people’s lives. Something
other than or in addition to expectations of privacy must be at
work.
There are, of course, similar problems in the electronic world.
Indeed, the more we learn about the scope of intrusive actions by
both public and private entities, the less relevant does the “expectation of privacy” rubric become. There no longer can be a cultural
belief that our personal lives are invisible or unavailable to others.
We hope that much of what we deposit in online data clouds, say
on a telephone, or send in a text message or email stays private. But
we know that even the best-intentioned cloud manager makes mistakes or fails to detect hacking. And we also know that much of
what we post or send online easily may escape into the world or
government data caches. Granting only “friends” access to pictures and videos on Facebook hardly guarantees that they will remain visible just to that group. One right-click of a mouse allows
any “friend” to save such an image and then to send it to others.
The lack of privacy expectations, however, does not mean that eveprivacy cause of action against a broadcast outlet to the father of a rape victim when state
law barred the release of the victim’s name but reporters discovered it in public records.
The same basic result emerged a some years later in another Florida case, Florida Star v.
B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989). Further discussion of this issue may be found in later
segments of this Article, see infra note 239.
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rything about us that is visible to some machine or person—
whether online or not—should be available for appropriation or use
in all circumstances. That, of course, is the problem confronted
here.
B. Reconstructing Intrusive Privacy Violations
The traditional rules don’t ask the right questions. Just as in the
age of Warren and Brandeis, technology has dramatically altered
the ways in which moments may be appropriated, and perhaps
even more importantly, distributed. In the case of Svenson’s
Neighbors exhibition, images were displayed not only on the walls of
a gallery, but also online. So it is not just the traditional notion of
intrusion that is at issue. The ways in which incursions manifest
themselves in the world after a moment is appropriated also are
relevant. In the view of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, to say
nothing of the traditional construction of the Fourth Amendment,
it is the intrusion that is the harm.185 That is no longer the appropriate measure for the nature of the interests that need protection.
Contemporary issues are much more complex than in the 1970s
when the Restatement (Second) was written and Katz was decided.
We should applaud, rather than bemoan, the possibility that similar
sorts of intrusions might produce quite different legal results—
dependent at times upon what happens after the intrusion itself
occurs. Bright line rules no longer serve us very well. As Daniel Solove186 and Helen Nissenbaum187 have correctly noted, privacy law
needs to be thickly contextualized—each case placed in a deeply
fact-based setting. Though writing about technology-based privacy
issues, Helen Nissenbaum aptly framed the problem.
The framework of contextual integrity maintains
that the indignation, protest, discomfit, and resistance to technology-based information systems and
practices . . . invariably can be traced to breaches of
context-relative information norms. . . . Contextrelative informational norms are characterized by
four key parameters: context, actors, attributes and
185
186
187

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
See SOLOVE, supra note 22, at 39–41.
See NISSENBAUM, supra note 22, at 140–43, 186–230.
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transmission principles. Generally, they prescribe,
for a given context, the types of information, the
parties who are the subjects of the information as
well as those who are sending and receiving it, and
the principles under which this information is
transmitted.188
That means that it is not merely the way images are obtained,
but also the entire setting in which that event occurs and plays out
over time. We need to consider the nature of the observation by the
photographer, the methods used to obtain the information, the
physical setting in which the observation occurs, the dissemination
and distribution of the information, and the way the information is
used.189 Though such factor-based analytical structures reduce the
ability of relevant actors to predict dispute outcomes, they may
produce much more appropriate results. At least for now, that sort
of compromise is much better than the alternative. It makes more
sense to seek fair resolutions of modern privacy disputes than to
rigidly apply old rules that are losing their ability to cope with modern technological developments.190
C. Resolving the Foster Dispute
So, allow me a stab at resolving the Foster case. I suggest that
when the entire context of the Foster situation is taken into account, a strong argument may be made that Svenson’s behavior
was inappropriate. First, the observation was obtained surreptitiously and without express consent. Second, the non-consensually
taken images were shot from the shadows of Svenson’s apartment
using a camera with the capacity to zoom in on the subjects. Third,
the images were taken of people during the routines of their daily
lives and in the confines of their homes above street level. Fourth,
Svenson did not just record the digital images and save them for his
personal use; he also composed images, blew them up and arranged
188

Id. at 140–41.
A similar point is made by Jane Yakowitz Bambauer in The New Intrusion, 88 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 204, 211–13 (2012).
190
One of the finest articles about the constantly changing tension between bright line
and flexible rules is Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV.
577 (1988).
189
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for their display in both a gallery and on a web site. Finally, the two
images the Fosters sued over displayed the faces of their children.
Is it appropriate for this sort of photographic endeavor to use children as its subjects? Let’s review each of these factors to discover if
they construct an edifice.
1. The Consent Conundrum
Those in Svenson’s view finder had no idea they were being
photographed from the shadows of his loft and no way of finding
out unless the images were publicly displayed or the serendipity
gods intervened. That may well not be enough by itself to penalize
him. Many images captured without the knowledge and consent of
the subject are not—and should not—be considered privacy problems. Conversely, images obtained consensually but later distributed without permission might raise serious concerns. It is not
that the presence or absence of consent determines the appropriate
result in every context, but only that it alters the context. If Svenson, for example, had knocked on the doors of his neighbors’
apartments, described his project, and obtained their permission to
take pictures for a period of time without further bargaining, it is
hard to imagine that any legal repercussions should follow. Taking
a picture of someone with their consent, regardless of the setting in
which the photograph is made, is typically legitimate. Consent, in
short, is highly likely to prevent privacy litigation about the mere
creation of an image.191 Its absence, however, leaves the door open
for later disputation—if the context is right.
On the other hand, obtaining consent to do one thing doesn’t
automatically carry with it permission to do another. Even if Svenson obtained consent to aim his camera into an apartment and take
a picture, it is not clear that such permission carries distributional
rights with it. Lack of consent may by itself raise a red flag, but
presence of consent to take a picture doesn’t automatically carry
with it control over all uses of the image.192 Later actions, there191

Note well that this discussion is only about the taking of a picture, not what is done
with it. The question of consent, of course, may extend beyond the creation stage, but
that simply moves the context further down the decisional matrix.
192
I am putting aside copyright issues here. Typically, the owner of the copyright in an
image has the right to sell and exploit it. But if a photograph is taken in violation of
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fore, may create quite complex problems. Taking pictures or videos
of intimate behavior with the agreement of all adult participants in
the episode may be unwise, but is usually legal. Distribution of the
images to others, however, may create a wholly different context.
Revenge porn is the obvious example.193 More mundane consent
issues surface in an array of contexts. Consider, for example, the
Google Street View controversies brewing in Europe.194 While
there are some European rulings suggesting that the nonconsensual taking of pictures of people by roving equipment and
the placement of the images online are privacy invasions, the problem disappears if appropriate consent is obtained. Walking down
the street while your picture is taken in the United States has not
yet been deemed a problem, but clearly the lack of consent may
lead to disputes in settings where obtaining permission obviates
them. Given changes in context, the lack of consent may be telling.
The meaning of consent itself also is a major problem. While
express grants of permission typically remove privacy concerns if
the terms of the consent are clear,195 the dispute with Svenson and
privacy rights, those rights may trump the right to exploit the intellectual property
interests. Think about up-skirt or Peeping Tom photographs: surely the ownership of a
copyright in the picture taker doesn’t justify bestowing distribution rights in the images.
Such disputes may raise interesting preemption issues not taken up here.
193
There have been a number of major controversies in recent years about the
distribution of consensually taken intimate videos after the sexual partners separate. One
of the most serious involved the conviction of Kevin Bollaert for identity theft and
extortion arising out of the operation of two revenge porn websites. Nicky Woolf, San
Diego Jury Convicts Revenge-Porn Website Operator Kevin Bollaert, GUARDIAN (Feb. 3,
2015, 7:58 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/culture/2015/feb/03/revenge-porn-web
site-operator-convicted-san-diego-kevin-bollaert [http://perma.cc/65T9-KBVX].
194
For a survey of the different rules in the United States and Europe in this area, see
Geissler, supra note 166, at 897. There are very few cases in the United States. In the
absence of trespass claims or allegations that Google equipment picked up and stored
signals from open wireless systems, the courts have not found any privacy problems. See
Joffe v. Google, Inc., 746 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 2013); Boring v. Google, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 2d
695, rev’d on other grounds, 362 F. App’x 273 (3d Cir. 2010).
195
Problems, of course, can occur here as well, for “express” consent to use an image
may be obtained under tenuous circumstances. On February 25, 2015, my wife and I
attended a concert in a small space at Lincoln Center to listen to music from Bach’s
magnificent Cello Suites. We ordered and paid for the tickets online and picked them up
on arrival at the venue. The back of each ticket contained typical provisions designating
them as licenses, but they also contained the following provision:
This event may be recorded (by audiovisual or photographic means),
and such recordings may include pictures of the audience or
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the issues that might surface from the actions of Wolf or Iverson
involve puzzling notions of constructive consent. Svenson’s images
were obtained through open windows across a fairly narrow street.
Using his words, Svenson took that as a sign that “there is no question of privacy.”196 When New Yorkers living in buildings with
large windows leave their curtains open or shades up, does that
connote consent for others to look inside? Surely the answer sometimes must be “yes!” Walking down any street, especially at night,
often opens to public view the interiors of first floor apartments or
bottom levels of town houses. It would be absurd to contend that
residents who leave their windows uncovered assume that no one
ever looks inside. Indeed, we are told we must assume that government authorities always have the right to look!

My photograph while walking the High Line on May 15, 2015.
The apartment building is The Caledonia at 450 West 17th Street.

individuals in the audience. Your attendance at the event shall be
deemed your consent to appear in such recordings and to the
unlimited exploitation of such recordings in any and all media now
known or hereafter devised.
If someone’s image is used in a video recording, is its use any more consensual than the
use of an image of the Fosters by Svenson?
196
These words are taken from his description of The Neighbors exhibition.
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Or what of those who purchase glass walled apartments directly
abutting or easily visible from the pedestrian level of the High
Line197 a magnificent walking park that meanders mostly mid-block
above street level between 13th and 34th Streets on the west side of
Manhattan on the bed of an old freight train trestle.198★ Owners of
apartments by the High Line are regularly both gazers of the passing people parade and objects of attention by those sauntering by.
Some, as they admitted when interviewed, recognized that purchasing units at park level involved loss of privacy. They expected
to have eye contact—if not discourse—with those walking by.
Some even greet park visitors like kids wave at fire trucks. Others
in buildings by the High Line claimed they intentionally avoided
buying lower level units.199
Do those of us living well above street (or park) level confront
similar issues? Must we assume that some residents living across
the street in equally tall buildings peer out of their windows, sometimes with binoculars or telescopes? Telescopes are not sold in a
city like New York, where the stars rarely shine, unless there is a
market for them. Consent in this and other urban contexts becomes
ambiguous, if not meaningless. The traditional rubric about “expectation of privacy”—in many ways a proxy for consent—loses
contact with the reality of daily life in cities. The issue is not only
whether we grant our neighbors consent to peer inside when our
shades are up but what we give consent for under such circumstances. Looking is one thing; staring is another. Taking a picture is
one thing; taking a picture with a telephoto lens is another. Looking
inside for a period of time is one thing; making a video is another.
Here too, the context is critical. Even if taking a picture with a telephoto lens equipped camera through an unobstructed window is
197

Visit the park website at FRIENDS OF THE HIGHLINE, http://www.thehighline.org/
[http://perma.cc/FJR6-NVZ8] (last visited Sept. 28, 2015). The High Line runs from
Gansevoort Street on the south next to the new Whitney Museum of American Art in the
Meatpacking District northwest of Greenwich Village, and ends at 34th Street after
circling around the enormous Hudson Yards development now being constructed over
the train yards west of Pennsylvania Station.
198★
I walked part of the High Line on May 15, 2015 and took a few pictures of apartment
buildings, including that of The Caledonia displayed at Richard H. Chused, The High
Line, APPROPRIATE(D) MOMENTS, www.rhchused.com/Moments18.html [http://perma.
cc/LE9E-MJX6] (last visited Sept. 28, 2015).
199
See Steven Kurutz, Close Quarters, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2012, at D1.
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constructively consensual, what is done with that photo after it’s
taken may be unacceptable. The more extensive the duration, magnification, and distribution of the imaging, the less likely it is that
constructing consent from the presence of an unobstructed view is
appropriate. Would it really be acceptable for a videographer to
hide a camera in a bush on the High Line and take hours of movies
of those in an apartment? Who should have the burden of obstructing the view—the videographer by stopping the camera or the resident by pulling down the shades? Surely it cannot be that we must
live behind stone walls in order to avoid inappropriate appropriation of moments in our lives.200★
The point is well made by an old example of the problem—
Peeping Tom statutes.201 New York, for example, criminalizes unlawful surveillance under a fairly modern statute adopted in 2003
and recently amended. Here is one of its provisions:
A person is guilty of unlawful surveillance in the
second degree when . . . [f]or his or her own, or
another person’s amusement, entertainment, or
profit, or for the purpose of degrading or abusing a
person, he or she intentionally uses or installs, or
permits the utilization or installation of an imaging
device to surreptitiously view, broadcast or record a
person dressing or undressing or the sexual or other
intimate parts of such person at a place and time
200★

Another photograph I took of an unremodeled structure from the High Line in 2012
before the recent deluge of new buildings went up displays what use of cement blocks to
avoid gazing might look like. See Richard H. Chused, Cement Blocks, APPROPRIATE(D)
MOMENTS, http://www.rhchused.com/Moments19.html [http://perma.cc/M9H5-37FV]
(last visited Sept. 28, 2015).
201
About half the states have voyeurism or “Peeping Tom” statutes. See Timothy J.
Horstmann, Protecting Traditional Privacy Rights in a Brave New Digital World: The Threat
Posed by Cellular Phone-Cameras and What States Should Do To Stop It, 111 PENN ST. L.
REV. 739 (2007). The phrase “Peeping Tom” comes from a legend of 11th century
Coventry in England. Lady Godiva, the wife of Leforic III, Earl of Mercia, urged her
husband to reduce the burdensome taxes on the town. He agreed if she would ride naked
from one end of Mercia to the other. She agreed, so the story goes, and successfully
persuaded all the residents to avert their eyes as she did so. The first mention that a man
named Tom peeked doesn’t appear until the 18th century, but that addition to the legend
became the basis for our modern phraseology. See Charles Coe, Lady Godiva: The Naked
Truth, HARV. MAG. (July–Aug. 2003), http://harvardmagazine.com/2003/07/ladygodiva-the-naked-tr.html [http://perma.cc/R27D-2CXL].
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when such person has a reasonable expectation of
privacy, without such person’s knowledge or consent.202
The statute is highly contextualized and presumes consent is
absent. The picture taker must have the intent to amuse him or
herself, to profit from the activity, or to degrade or abuse another
person. And the image taking that is barred relates only to sexually
oriented materials obtained when a person is in an area where disrobing typically proceeds privately. I mention this sort of statute
not because it applies to Svenson’s setting: it doesn’t—at least as
far as I can tell.203 But it clearly demonstrates the perils of ending
discussion of privacy issues once we know whether actions were
taken with or without consent or whether pictures were taken
through unshaded windows. Concluding that Svenson would have
invaded the Fosters’ privacy if he surreptitiously peered into their
bedroom while they were undressing does not compel us to reach
similar conclusions if he photographed them chatting in their living
room. Clearly the nature of the picture taking also is important.
2. The Nature of the Picture Taking
The sometimes ambiguous quality of consent is particularly relevant in the Svenson setting—large windows, blinds or shades up,
curtains open, people making themselves visible. While express
consent was never obtained, there almost surely was some unquantifiable level of permission granted to look inside, so the details of
the picture taking become critically important. The more secretive
and intrusive the viewing, the more willing we should be to condemn the activity. In this case, Svenson commented—perhaps
gloated—about taking pictures from the shadows of his loft. It is
worth repeating his description of the project.
For my subjects there is no question of privacy; they
are performing behind a transparent scrim on a
202

N.Y. PENAL LAW § 250.45 (McKinney 2009). Elsewhere in the statute is this
definition: “‘Place and time when a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy’ . . .
mean[s] a place and time when a reasonable person would believe that he or she could
fully disrobe in privacy.” PENAL § 250.40.
203
One image does appear to have been taken into a bedroom, but other requirements of
the statute probably are not met. See discussion infra Part III.C.3.
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stage of their own creation with the curtain raised
high. The Neighbors don’t know they are being photographed; I carefully shoot from the shadows of my
home into theirs. I am not unlike the birder, quietly
waiting for hours, watching for the flutter of a hand
or the movement of a curtain as an indication that
there is life within.204
There are several qualities of this text that are disturbing—that
connote a much more intrusive frame of reference than a momentary glimpse or even spontaneous picture taking through an unobstructed window. Though his intent probably was unlike that required by New York’s anti-surveillance statute, Svenson took precautions to avoid being seen by those he was photographing. He
waited for significant periods of time hoping that an interesting
scene would develop. Deploying the word “stalking” probably
pushes too far, for there is no evidence he harbored any malicious
feelings towards those he was watching. But “stakeout” catches
the mood—a long-term period of watching and hoping.205 At some
ineffable point, peering into the apartment of another morphs from
acceptable—sometimes even welcomed—urban behavior to unnecessary and unacceptable intrusion. Reactions of this sort also are
appropriate after looking at both Michelle Iverson’s work and her
artist statement. Combine a lengthy stare at night with equipment
that enlarges the image and makes events and people more visible
and the context becomes more difficult to justify. The lack of consent takes on added significance in such a setting. Taking a quick
shot through an open window may be one thing. “Hanging out”
waiting for something to happen may be quite another.206
204

Gorence, supra note 4.
As already noted, police may make use of information obtained by gazing into
unobstructed spaces. Why shouldn’t that automatically connote that Svenson’s actions
were perfectly legitimate? On the surface, at least, it seems that the potential harm to the
parties being staked out (criminal prosecution) is greater than any result someone like
Svenson may produce. The difference, I suggest, lies in the public purposes served by the
two intruders. Criminal prosecutions are brought to protect the public from harm.
Svenson, however, cannot serve as a proxy for that sort of public goal. He may, of course,
further First Amendment goals. See discussion infra Part III.D.2.
206
At some level, Iverson realized the controversial nature of her work. In an interview
of her, see Weingart, supra note 14, she noted that a stroller saw her sitting her in her car
205
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3. The Scenes Taken
Though many of the views Svenson snapped through the
apartment windows of The Zinc and used in his exhibition were
partially or totally unobstructed by shades or blinds, the scenes
captured were sometimes quite startling. Two images from the exhibition not involving the Fosters best raise the issues. One—
Neighbors #5—shows a woman on her hands and knees. There are
objects in the background suggesting she is assembling some furniture or cabinets. Her rear end faces the viewer.207 It was hung
greatly enlarged at the Julie Saul Gallery. An image of it with a man
staring at it was published in news reports.208 Several thoughts
come to mind. First, Svenson’s image is particularly suggestive.
Though the person in the photograph is identifiable only by people
who know her, the position of her body is not one most women
would typically want others to stare at, regardless of whether the
viewing occurs only with the naked eye, with the aid of an enlargement device or telephoto lens equipped camera, in a gallery, or online.209 The thought of someone hiding in the shadows of their
apartment waiting for someone across the street to assume such a
position is disturbing. Another image is troubling for related but
somewhat different reasons. It depicts a woman wearing a robe sitting on her bed with her back to the camera. There is a towel
wrapped around her head—presumably drying wet hair—and she
is looking down at and using an object (perhaps a cell phone) in her

with a camera and approached her. Rather than deal with him, she quickly drove away.
Why?
207
This image is available at The Neighbors, ARNE SVENSON, http://arnesvenson.com/
theneighbors.html [http://perma.cc/5HP8-YAB3] (last visited Sept. 28, 2015). I have
elected not to show it here.
208
A Fox News article about the case contained the scene. NYC Artist’s Secret Photos of
Neighbors Raise Privacy Issues; For Some, ‘A Line Crossed,’ FOX NEWS (May 17, 2013),
http://www.foxnews.com/leisure/2013/05/17/nyc-artist-secret-photos-neighbors-raiseprivacy-issues-for-some-line-crossed [http://perma.cc/U9TR-CZGK].
209
In discussions I’ve had with Muslim women students about gender separation in
mosques, one issue that has surfaced is their concern about being watched by men when
they pray with their foreheads on the floor in a crouching position. Putting aside the
philosophical and religious issues raised by gender segregation in places of worship, I can
understand the cultural and social problems associated with taking such positions in front
of men.
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hand.210 It comes perilously close to violating the Peeping Tom
surveillance statute, though Svenson probably lacked the requisite
intent to trigger a criminal prosecution. Nonetheless, it is difficult
to believe this is an image most women would care to have publicly
distributed.211
Other photographs raise similar problems in less intensive
ways. One displays the lower parts of the torsos and legs of a man
and an obviously pregnant woman sitting across from each other
with their legs on an ottoman while they are dressed in their
robes.212 Another pictures a napping man lying on his side with his
back to the window and part of his lower back exposed to view.213
In each case, Svenson appropriated particularly personal moments—ones where we all may have serious qualms about the propriety of someone staring through a window for a significant period
of time and capturing such poses. The content may not by itself be
enough to justify calling them invasions of privacy, but when combined with the lack of clear consent and the nature of the photography process, the potential for impropriety rises.
4. Display and Distribution
Ironically, or perhaps perversely, the Fosters did not feel or
sense intrusion in the absence of knowledge generated by the public
display and distribution of Svenson’s images. Though his artistic
210

See SVENSON, supra note 2, at Neighbors #14; Neighbors #14, JULIE SAUL GALLERY,
http://www.saulgallery.com/artists/arne-svenson/neighbors#17 [http://perma.cc/R875GCNY] (last visited Sept. 28, 2015).
211
It may be worth noting that most of the Svenson pictures posted on the Gallery
website were of women. Of the twenty-five on the site, fourteen featured female subjects,
four male, two of both men and women, one was unclear, and five had neither. Though
these numbers may suggest Svenson has a particular interest in taking pictures of women,
it also is possible that they simply demonstrate that women are more likely to be at home
during the day when most of the photographs were taken. It also is interesting that
Svenson did not display any nudity in his pictures. It is certainly not outlandish to assume
that unclothed or partially unclothed people appeared in his view finder from time to
time. Perhaps he declined to take such images.
212
See SVENSON, supra note 2, at Neighbors #1; Neighbors #1, JULIE SAUL GALLERY,
http://www.saulgallery.com/artists/arne-svenson/neighbors#21
[http://
perma.cc/3AVL-BM44] (last visited Sept. 28, 2015).
213
See SVENSON, supra note 2, at Neighbors #11; Neighbors #11, JULIE SAUL GALLERY,
http://www.saulgallery.com/artists/arne-svenson/neighbors#5 [http://perma.cc/8UFZAWZM] (last visited Sept. 28, 2015).
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instincts certainly make his actions understandable and at least partially justifiable, the decision to move surreptitiously taken photographs into the public realm amplifies the impact of the intrusion in
quite dramatic ways. That is particularly true today given the pervasiveness and speed of the digital world. Rather than leading to
the loss of privacy rights in accordance with some traditional privacy rules, the public display should be deemed to enhance the possibility of obtaining relief from the party responsible for creating public knowledge of the intrusion. In this case, the images were both
displayed in a gallery and posted online. Each step has different and
potentially troublesome consequences.
First, consider the gallery exhibition. As the discussion of the
image of a crouching woman working on her hands and knees
makes clear, Svenson’s photographs were dramatically enlarged
and hung in a spacious room. If, as suggested, there is something
untoward about the nature of the images themselves, that effect is
markedly amplified by the dramatic size and spacious setting used
to display the pictures. When I displayed the exhibition picture of a
man staring at the image of the rear of a crouching woman in front
of my colleagues for a significant period of time while answering
questions about an earlier draft of this paper, some in attendance
got uneasy. One colleague noted that it was a bit unnerving to sit
for twenty minutes watching a man with his back to the camera
looking at the hindquarters of a woman working on her hands and
knees. That’s a fair observation and it made me think deeply about
whether I should show such images to anyone—whether in an educational setting or not. The gallery display not only made Svenson’s images available for public viewing, it also made it possible to
stare at the images for as long as—or even longer—than Svenson
stared through the windows of The Zinc building. He made it possible for others to experience the same feelings and emotions he may
have felt as he waited in the shadows and took the pictures. As we
look at the images, we become intruders just as he was. That, of
course, was surely one of his artistic motivations: he wanted us to
sense our own voyeuristic impulses. But that also accentuates the
problems with his work. The very artistic sensibilities he played
with are what raise privacy concerns. With each step along the path
to the gallery show—looking across the street, waiting in shadows
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for long periods of time, taking pictures, using a telephoto lens,
capturing particularly touchy or intimate moments, enlarging the
images, displaying the photographs publicly—the context becomes
more seriously intrusive.
It also is worth noting that a significant period of time did not
elapse between the time the pictures were taken and displayed. If
Walker Evans was justified in showing his surreptitious subway
pictures twenty-five years after they were taken,214 or Judge Meyer
was correct in allowing Frederick Wiseman to display Titicut Follies
without restraint decades after it was originally filmed,215 those decisions reinforce the likelihood that harm is more likely when secretly obtained images of recognizable people are displayed within
a short time of their taking. Unsurprisingly, both the Fosters and
Kravetz were concerned not only about the way their images were
captured on film, but also about the speedy public display of the
appropriated moments.
Both the gallery and Svenson took one more step: each made
the photographs available online.216 Though the significant enlargements made for the gallery were not duplicated online by a
viewer’s use of a standard computer monitor,217 much of the rest of
the impact of the gallery show is replicated. Viewers gain access to
the pictures and the ability to look at them for as long as they wish.
And, perhaps most importantly, once pictures find their way online, it often is very difficult either to control their further distribution or to remove them. Though both the Julie Saul Gallery and
Svenson took down the images of the Foster children while the litigation was pending and the published exhibition book omitted both
pictures, one of the photographs is now available on the gallery’s
website.218 While the images were unavailable, I still managed to
find them. The fairly widespread media discussions of the Foster/Svenson dispute also led to the distribution of exhibition images
214

See Sante, supra note 130.
See Langner, supra note 137.
216
See SVENSON, supra note 2; The Neighbors, supra note 2.
217
That, of course, need not always be the case with computer based digital images.
Many households now have the capacity to display pictures stored on a computer using
very large monitors or huge television screens.
218
See Neighbors #12, JULIE SAUL GALLERY, http://www.saulgallery.com/artists/arnesvenson/neighbors#1 [http://perma.cc/VZ4H-9UJA] (last visited Dec. 21, 2015).
215
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around the world.219 That speaks mountains about the nature of the
contemporary digital realm and the ways in which privacy rules focusing only on an intrusion itself are short-sighted. Moving images
to a website may mean they ride off on an unchartered, unpredictable, and uncontrollable journey. If they do, concerns about the methods used to take the images in the first place are heightened.
5. Children
Both the Fosters and Kravetz were particularly upset by the
presence of their children in the pictures taken by Svenson. It is
clear that consent was not obtained and could not be constructed to
allow taking pictures of the children under the circumstances of
this case. They had nothing to do with leaving the shades up. Since
their parents were totally unaware of what Svenson was doing, they
were in no position to grant permission on behalf of their offspring,
either actually or constructively. We often opine that parents have
the right—even at a constitutional level—to make decisions on behalf of their minor children.220 But it is difficult to see how that idea
is triggered in a case like this. And even if parents sometimes may
waive the privacy rights of their children, there is an open question
about how extensive that right may be.221 It would, I think, be stretching even an artificial notion of consent to allow Svenson to assume he has the freedom to gain access to the lives of the
youngsters just because he could see them through an open window. In short, even if he was justified in taking all the other photographs of adults, the two of the Foster children fell into a different
category. When all the characteristics of the Svenson project are
taken into account, therefore, there are strong arguments that privacy law should limit such activities.
219

I found them on English and German sites. There is, of course, deep irony in this
result as well, for it was only because the Fosters publicly condemned Svenson’s work
and then filed a lawsuit that the story gained widespread attention in the media. Should
Svenson be held responsible for this?
220
See, e.g., Troel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (discussing the parental right to
control access to their children); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (discussing the
right of parents to refuse using public schools for religious reasons); Pierce v. Soc’y of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (discussing the right of parents to send their children to
private schools).
221
See, e.g., Benjamin Shmueli & Ayelet Blecher-Prigat, Privacy for Children, 42 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 759 (2011).
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D. An Elephant in the Room
There is an elephant in the room that needs to be addressed.
Bemoaning the intrusive methods of surveillance photographers
like Svenson does not totally negate either the long artistic heritage
of the genre or the importance of the artistic messages the genre
presents to us. It goes without saying that an artist’s desire to publicly comment upon the voyeuristic tendencies of the human
psyche may fall within the ambit of the First Amendment. It therefore is not surprising that significant parts of privacy law and related doctrines are limited by free speech considerations. Media
coverage placing a public person in a false light creates a viable tort
action only when accompanied by malicious intent.222 The same is
true in defamation cases—closely related to false light disputes.223
That is understandable in both settings. The tort is based upon the
qualities of speech itself, disconnected from any actions that may
have been taken to create it. In such settings, requiring those seeking relief to demonstrate significant intentional misbehavior is sensible, but this sort of rule does not obviously apply to privacy torts
involving intrusions. Though the images made and distributed by
Svenson certainly carry some level of First Amendment protection
with them, the methods by which the images were obtained do not
evoke speech metaphors in the same way.224 It is difficult to claim
that the First Amendment privileges taking a picture of an intimate
space if the total context of the photographic adventure is inappropriate. Surely, for example, a picture taken and released for publi222

See, e.g., Cantrell v. Forest City Publ’g Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974); Time, Inc. v. Hill,
385 U.S. 374 (1967). Liability requires that the report be published with knowledge of its
falsity or reckless disregard of its truth.
223
Some contend that the false light tort serves no purpose different than defamation
and should be abolished. See, e.g., Sandra F. Chance & Christina M. Locke, When Even the
Truth Isn’t Good Enough: Judicial Inconsistency in False Light Cases Threatens Free Speech, 9
FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 546 (2011).
224
The speech versus action dichotomy, with the latter more easily regulated, is
treacherous at best. Art “scenes” may stretch the distinction to the breaking point,
whether we think of dance or Marina Abramovic sitting at a table in the lobby of the
Museum of Modern Art staring at strangers for a period of time. See Jim Dwyer,
Confronting a Stranger, For Art, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2010, at MB1. Nonetheless, there are
times when the Supreme Court has made use of the dichotomy, as when criminalizing
draft card burning during the Vietnam War was approved. See United States v. O’Brien,
391 U.S. 367 (1968).
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cation by an archetypical Peeping Tom could be suppressed even if
it was aesthetically amazing.
Dealing comprehensively with this issue would require a long
exegesis. This Article already is lengthy. So my plan is to use just a
few examples and cases to outline the basic contours of my contention that the First Amendment does not and should not bar or severely constrain a claim by the Fosters that Svenson invaded their
privacy. Compare three sets of well-known disputes. The first involves the revelation by newspapers or television media of the
names of rape victims or juvenile offenders despite state statutes
barring the release of such information. In general, the Supreme
Court has concluded that the First Amendment protects such actions by news media.225 Second, consider the very narrow degree to
which the First Amendment restricts publicity rights claims. While
using the likeness or name of a well-known person in a way unrelated to efforts to sell a product is protected by free speech considerations, other publicity rights claims may go forward unimpeded
by constitutional constraints.226 Finally, there is another set of disputes involving efforts to constrain demonstrations—sometimes by
people uttering or displaying horribly-phrased insults—near abortion clinics, churches, funerals and other events or spaces. The
Court’s reluctance to limit such demonstrations creates further
tension with privacy doctrine. It is not at all clear that these lines of
cases either can or should be reconciled, but I’ll do the best I can to
trace my way through the disorder.
1. Name Revelation Cases
The classic name revelation case is Cox Broadcasting Corp. v.
Cohn,227 decided in 1975. Six students from Sandy Springs High
School, in a suburb north of Atlanta, were charged with the rape
and murder of Cynthia Cohn, the seventeen-year-old daughter of
Martin Cohn. A Georgia statute established a privacy norm by
making the publication or broadcast of the name of a rape victim a
225

See infra Part III.D.1.
For a general overview of cases and literature in the area, see Dora Georgescu, Two
Tests Unite to Resolve the Tension Between the First Amendment and the Right of Publicity, 83
FORDHAM L. REV. 907 (2014).
227
420 U.S. 469 (1975).
226
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misdemeanor.228 The state also had a common law privacy tort,
including claims for unlawful disclosure of private information.229
The student defendants appeared in court on April 10, 1972. Tom
Wassell was assigned by WSB-TV in Atlanta to cover the event.
He sat through most of the proceedings in which five of the six defendants pled guilty to rape in return for dismissal of the murder
charges they faced. The other defendant’s trial was put over to a
later date. During the hearing, various statements were made by
the parties and prosecutors revealing the name of the victim. In addition, Wassell approached the clerk sitting in front of the bench
during a recess and asked to see the indictments. The clerk complied with the request, making no effort to conceal information
about the identity of Ms. Cohn. As a result, her name was learned
by Wassell and then mentioned during a television broadcast a bit
later.230 Her father filed suit against Wassell and Cox Broadcasting
Corp., the television station owner.231
Justice White, writing for the Court, was careful in the way he
described the case.
[W]e should recognize that we do not have at issue
here an action for the invasion of privacy involving
the appropriation of one’s name or photograph, a
physical or other tangible intrusion into a private
area, or a publication of otherwise private informa228

GA. CODE ANN. § 26-9901 (1972) then provided:
It shall be unlawful for any news media or any other person to print
and publish, broadcast, televise, or disseminate through any other
medium of public dissemination or cause to be printed and published,
broadcast, televised, or disseminated in any newspaper, magazine,
periodical or other publication published in this State or through any
radio or television broadcast originating in the State the name or
identity or any female who may have been raped or upon whom an
assault with intent to commit rape may have been made. Any person
or corporation violating the provisions of this section shall, upon
conviction, be punished as for a misdemeanor.
The section was later codified at GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-23, but was invalidated by the
Georgia court in Dye v. Wallace, 553 S.E.2d 561 (Ga. 2001).
229
Georgia may have been the first state to declare the existence of a range of common
law privacy torts. The most famous case is Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co., 50
S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905), decided in the same era New York declined to move in that direction.
230
See Cox, 420 U.S. at 472–74.
231
See id. at 474.
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tion that is also false although perhaps not defamatory. The version of the privacy tort now before
us—termed in Georgia the tort of public disclosure—is that in which the plaintiff claims the right
to be free from unwanted publicity about his private
affairs, which, although wholly true, would be offensive to a person of ordinary sensibilities. Because the
gravamen of the claimed injury is the publication of
information, whether true or not, the dissemination
of which is embarrassing or otherwise painful to an
individual, it is here that claims of privacy most directly confront the constitutional freedoms of
speech and press.232
Confronting potentially conflicting privacy and free speech
claims with long-standing doctrinal support, the Court balanced
the relevant interests. It rejected efforts by the defendants to privilege truthful commentary or to impose on the plaintiff high-level
intention requirements like those operating in defamation and false
light cases. Instead, while recognizing the importance of the values
protected by Georgia’s victim-anonymity statute, Justice White
noted three factors that required barring Cohn’s tort claim in this
particular case. First, in spite of the rape victim protection statute,
public officials revealed Cynthia Cohn’s identity to the press and
handed over the indictments for perusal by a reporter.233 In the absence of bureaucratic efforts to protect privacy, it was hard to take
Georgia’s victim protection policy very seriously.234 Second, the
parties revealing the information to the general public were the
most “saintly” for First Amendment purposes—traditional media
outlets long cloaked in a constitutional mantle.235 Finally, the information Wassell revealed was about a regionally notorious case
and therefore was a matter of public interest and importance.236
Once public officials revealed the victim’s identity, television sta232

Id. at 489.
Id. at 492–93.
234
The Court referred to the Restatement (Second) privacy provisions, see supra note
153, and noted that they probably did not protect claims after information was revealed to
the public. See 420 U.S. at 493–94.
235
Id.
236
See id.
233
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tions and newspapers could pass that information on to the world
at large.
In many ways, the result is unattractive. In an era when rape
victims often were shamed as much or more than the perpetrators
of the crime, the Georgia privacy scheme made enormous sense.
Today, the cultural proclivity to victimize the victim may have
eased, though many surely would claim to the contrary. But for
purposes of this Article, two aspects of the result in Cox strongly
suggest that Svenson may not claim the same privilege as Wassell
or Cox: Svenson neither replicated the role of the press in Cox, nor
revealed information about a matter of public importance.
First, reconsider the impact of Justice White’s opinion by
changing the facts a bit. Suppose Martin Cohn had sued the prosecutor and court clerk—the parties who first revealed the identity of
his daughter to Wassell. That significantly changes the nature and
context of the privacy inquiry. Rather than worrying about the First
Amendment protections surrounding the revelation of information
by traditional media to the general public, this new case considers
only the relationship between parties holding privacy rights and
those who directly intrude upon them. There is an information
chain from victim identification by the coroner, to police, to prosecuting authorities, to court officials, and finally to media. At some
point the link to unlawful privacy intrusion may break. Perhaps, as
the Cox court suggested, members of the press and TV media are
the proper break-point.237 But freeing them from liability, as the
Court did, does not relieve actors further back in the communication chain from liability for invasion of privacy. Indeed, strong arguments may be made that the actors originally breaching Cohn’s
privacy should be responsible for the harm caused by the media
even if media outlets themselves are not financially responsible.
There is an analogous information chain in the Foster/Svenson
dispute. It runs from the Foster family and their appropriated moments, to Svenson, to the Julie Saul Gallery, and finally to the media covering the show. While a media outlet or academic author
publishing images from the exhibition in magazines or newspapers,
displaying them on TV broadcasts, or placing them online may be
237

See id. at 496.
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protected by a First Amendment privilege similar to that operating
in Cox, those earlier in the information chain do not operate in the
same context. The photographer and gallery are the parties enabling the publication of otherwise private images. In fact, the publication of the information in the general media and online, as already
noted, exacerbated the impact of the original intrusion. Svenson
and the Saul Gallery are analogous to the prosecutors and court
clerk in Cox, not to Wassell and his TV station. In short, nothing in
Justice White’s opinion commands releasing Svenson and the Julie
Saul Gallery from liability for appropriating private moments. They
do not sit in the shoes of the press.
In addition, information revealed by displaying photographs of
the Fosters in a gallery was not of any public interest. While it may
have taken on qualities of importance after the media got wind of
the story and spread knowledge of it widely around the world, that
was not so when Svenson took his pictures and first hung them in a
gallery. The pictures were artistic to be sure, but they were not
cloaked with the typical aura surrounding general media discourse
about important public events. Consider some analogous cases,
none of which are typically thought to raise serious First Amendment problems. If a gallery displays a picture that infringes the
copyright of another work, it may be compelled to remove it and
pay damages for its public presentation. If a gallery displays a picture invading a famous person’s publicity rights, it may be compelled to take it down. If a gallery hangs a picture that is stolen
property it may be compelled to turn it over to the proper owner.
The First Amendment extends to an artist the general privilege of
creating a work, but only if some other interest of importance is not
violated.238 Similarly, Svenson has a right to take and display photographs, but only if in doing so he does not violate the substantive
rights of others.239

238

A book, for example, may be suppressed or the author forced to pay damages in a
defamation case.
239
There are three other well known cases that follow the basic structure of Cox. First,
Florida Star v. B.J.F, 491 U.S. 524 (1989), involved another rape victim identification.
Here, too, in the teeth of a Florida statute barring use of a rape victim’s identity in the
media, public officials revealed an identity. The Supreme Court barred suit against a
newspaper that published the name.
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2. Publicity Rights and the First Amendment
When the Fosters first sought preliminary injunction relief
from the New York courts, their right of publicity claim was dismissed on First Amendment grounds. The Supreme Court of New
York opined:
Plaintiffs cannot establish a likelihood of success
on the merits. Defendant’s photos are protected by
the First Amendment in the form of art and therefore shielded from New York’s Civil Rights
Law . . . . Through the photos, Defendant is communicating his thoughts and ideas to the public.
Additionally, they serve more than just an advertising or trade purpose because they promote the enjoyment of art in the form of a displayed exhibition.
The value of artistic expression outweighs any sale
that stems from the published photos.
Further, since the art is protected by the First
Amendment, any advertising that is undertaken in
connection with promoting that art is permitted.
Defendant and the art gallery used Plaintiff’s photos
to advertise The Neighbors; and the advertising is
beyond the limits of the statute because it related to
the protected exhibition itself. Further, The Neighbors exhibition is a legitimate news item because cultural attractions are matters of public and consumer
interest. Therefore, news agencies and television
networks are entitled to use Defendant’s photographs of Plaintiffs, which have a direct relationship
to the news items—the photos are the focus of the
newsworthy content.240

The two other cases, Oklahoma Publ’g Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977)
and See; Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979), involved the revelation of
names of juvenile court defendants. In both cases, identities were discovered via official
channels. In one case, reporters were allowed to attend a court proceeding. Oklahoma
Publ’g, 430 U.S. at 309. In the other, names were obtained by monitoring police radio
channels. Smith, 443 U.S. at 99. Seeking relief from the media was barred in both cases.
240
Foster v. Svenson, No. 651826/2013, 2013 WL 3989038, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 5,
2013) (internal citations omitted).
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The Appellate Division affirmed this result using very similar
language.241 New York courts have consistently construed the state
Civil Rights law to allow use of the likeness or identity of a person
to report on newsworthy or publicly important events related to the
likeness or identity, including art exhibitions.242 They also have
studiously declined to create any types of privacy claims other than
now traditional publicity rights actions brought to bar use of a person’s identity to sell a product.243 So the court’s approach is severely limited by its unwillingness to think about intrusions, and
the consequences of intrusions, as part of its analysis. The overall
conclusion that the Fosters’ claims are weak as a matter of New
York state law, therefore, is theoretically challengeable but legally
understandable. Nonetheless, the First Amendment analysis is dubious. By conflating the limitations of state law and constitutional
analysis, the opinion ends up being deeply flawed. Even if intrusive
privacy torts are not recognized in New York, that does not mean
that the impact of intrusive behavior may also be ignored for First
Amendment purposes. If an intrusion privacy tort was available to
the Fosters in New York, there is no obvious reason why it would
not frustrate Svenson’s desire to appropriate their private moments. That is made quite clear by a number of publicity rights
claims decided over the years. Two are seminal enough to make
them appropriate candidates for discussion here—Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.244 and ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing Inc.245
For decades, the Zacchini family participated in “thrill” shows
where various kin were shot out of a cannon into a net some distance away.246 During August and September of 1972, family members took flight daily at the Geauga County Fair in Burton, Ohio. In
late August, Hugo Zacchini noticed that a reporter was shooting
movies of the act. He asked that filming cease, but under orders
241

Foster v. Svenson, 128 A.D.3d 150, 160–63 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015).
See supra note 154.
243
See supra note 154.
244
433 U.S. 562 (1977).
245
332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003).
246
For an old newsreel of one of their shows, see Weird Reels, Human
Cannonball―Zacchini the Modern Münchhausen, YOUTUBE (Apr. 14, 2014),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EuTzWPJ73vY [https://perma.cc/JH7E-UQ4V].
242
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from those running WKYC in Cleveland, filming continued. On
September 1, the entire fifteen-second act was broadcast on the
11:00 PM news show.247 Zacchini then sued, claiming unlawful appropriation of the cannon shot act and seeking damages for its use.
The Ohio Supreme Court concluded that the First Amendment
protected the actions of the TV news station and that Zacchini’s
claim therefore must be dismissed.248 The United States Supreme
Court took the case to decide whether the First Amendment privileged the actions of WKYC.249
The Court declined to exempt the cannon shot broadcast from
tort liability. Justice White, writing for a slim 5–4 majority, opined
that WKYC was free to verbally report on the cannon shot, as well
as review and comment on it,250 but broadcasting the entire shot
was another matter. While false light or defamation tort rules protected the reputation of the victim and therefore were likely to involve media presentation of information about an important event,
publicity rights protected “the proprietary interest of the individual in his act in part to encourage such entertainment.”251 Intrusion
into such a propriety interest, just like infringement of a copyright,
might give rise to a cause of action without limitation because of
any policy embedded in the First Amendment.252
In ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing Inc.,253 Rick Rush254 made a
painting called The Masters of Augusta containing three different
images of Tiger Woods standing in front of the clubhouse at Augusta National, the site the Masters Golf Tournament.255★ The
247

Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 563–64.
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 351 N.E.2d 454 (Ohio 1976).
249
Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 565.
250
Id. at 569–70, 575.
251
Id. at 573.
252
See id. 569–70.
253
332 F.3d 915 (2003).
254
See About Rick, RICK RUSH ART, http://www.rickrushart.com/about-rick-rush/
[http://perma.cc/NQE9-3BBM] (last visited Dec. 20, 2015). The Masters of Augusta is
still available for purchase on this site. See The Masters of Augusta, RICK RUSH ART,
http://www.rickrushart.com/new-products-2/the-masters-of-augusta [http://perma.cc/
R24C-LMSA] (last visited Sept. 28, 2015).
255★
The image is available at Richard H. Chused, Tiger Woods Painting, APPROPRIATE(D)
MOMENTS, http://www.rhchused.com/Moments20.html [http://perma.cc/NA4V-QN
JH] (last visited Sept. 28, 2015).
248
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work celebrated Woods’s victory at the Masters in 1997, when he
set a tournament scoring record en route to becoming the youngest
person ever to win the championship. After completing the work,
Rush made editions of a print version for sale to the general public
with Jireh’s assistance. Woods’ licensing agent, ETW Corp., then
sued claiming violation of his publicity rights.256 Rush’s publisher,
Jireh, claimed that the First Amendment protected the artist’s
right to distribute the work in a variety of formats. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decided the dispute in Jireh’s favor and thereby allowed Rush to continue licensing items to Jireh for sale.257
In combination, Zacchini and Jireh create an understandable
and reasonable logical structure about the relationships between
the First Amendment and the right of publicity. If, as in Zacchini, a
personality-based product is used by another without consent for
commercial purposes or the use of the name or likeness of a public
person is used without consent in a way that leads reasonable viewers to think that the person endorses a product, then state law may
step in without inhibition from the First Amendment. If, however,
a public personality attempts to limit discussion of or writing about
their lives, to inhibit the use of their likeness or personality for artistic purposes, or to control the way media or authors describe
them to the public, the First Amendment will preclude such efforts. In the most obvious cases, the transformative use of a personality by those using arenas classically protected by the First
Amendment will be approved. As framed by the Jireh court,
[W]e conclude that Ohio would construe its right of
publicity as suggested in the Restatement (Third) of
Unfair Competition, . . . which articulates a rule
analogous to the rule of fair use in copyright law.
Under this rule, the substantiality and market effect
of the use of the celebrity’s image is analyzed in
256

The publicity right claim was joined with a number of others—trademark
infringement under the Lanham Act, dilution of the mark under the Lanham Act, unfair
competition and false advertising under the Lanham Act, and unfair competition and
deceptive trade practices under Ohio law. Only the publicity rights claim is of interest
here. As in Zacchini, Ohio law became the focus of attention. ETW was incorporated in
Ohio and claimed that state’s publicity rights rules were violated by Jireh. ETW Corp.,
332 F.3d at 919.
257
Id. at 938.
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light of the informational and creative content of the
defendant’s use. Applying this rule, we conclude
that Rush’s work has substantial and creative content which outweighs any adverse effect on ETW’s
market and that Rush’s work does not violate
Woods’s right of publicity.258
In short, just as First Amendment considerations are deeply
embedded in the meaning and use of the fair use rule in Copyright
law, so too does publicity rights doctrine operating at its best have
the equivalent of a fair use notion built into its structure. The fair
use literature and case law is vast and complex, but for purposes of
this Article, a simplified statement of the doctrine will suffice. Fair
use allows any of us to employ materials protected by copyright if
our new use is transformative and doesn’t negatively affect the
market for the original work.259 Application of the rule is intensely
fact-based and contextual. Similarly as publicity rights, the transformative use of a person’s likeness will be permissible if it doesn’t
have a negative impact on the ability of the public person to market
themselves for endorsements or other remunerative purposes. Or,
put another way, publicity rights operate to limit our ability to unfairly use the personality of another for our own commercial purposes.
That makes the results in Zacchini and Jireh both understandable and subject to disputation. That is not unusual in areas like fair
use where the rule is vaguely stated and open to multiple interpretations.260 The Zacchini shot certainly was worthy of some minimal
258

Id. at 937.
The fair use case law is enormous. It is impossible to accurately summarize it in one
sentence. Courts, when balancing the fair use factors listed in 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2014),
tend to focus on the interactions between the creative ways authors use prior material and
the impact such use will have on the market for the protected work. A good example is
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). The Court concluded that a 2 Live
Crew rap song entitled “Pretty Woman” was a permissible parody of the Roy Orbison
song “Oh, Pretty Woman.” For a parody to work, it must refer to the prior work. In
addition, authors are unlikely to make fun of their own creative efforts and parodies are
unlikely to have any impact on the market for the original. As a result, the transformations
wrought by a parody often are treated as fair use.
260
That the world of intellectual property law survived reasonably intact despite the
vagaries of fair use law suggests that nothing terrible will result from use of a highly factbased, contextual law of privacy intrusion.
259
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attention on a local news program. The Supreme Court said as
much.261 But that does not mean it was appropriate to display the
entire act if that action might both increase the audience for the
news program and reduce the size of the audience trooping to the
county fair to see the cannon shot. While such an economic effect,
and therefore the Court’s decision, is subject to question, the underlying approach is not. Similarly, it might well be that the impact
of Rush’s paintings was quite different from the television display
of the cannon shot. In contrast to the potential negative impact on
the size of the thrill’s market, Rush’s work may have had no impact on Wood’s ability to market his likeness by licensing and selling photographs of his choice. And though Rush might have used
Woods’ fame to attract buyers, his artistic talents, even if deemed
minimal, provided added context to justify the court’s result. I am
not suggesting that disagreement with both outcomes is untenable.
Quite the contrary is true. The broadcast of the cannon shot may
actually have increased the value of Zacchini’s act and the sale of
Rush’s work may have decreased the ability of Woods to market
works displaying him in action. But the methodology used in these
and many other publicity rights cases makes a great deal of
sense.262
So what does this all mean for the Foster case? Most importantly, the cases suggest that in arenas like publicity rights and privacy,
context is critically important in analyzing First Amendment cases.
When either commercial viability or intrusive behavior is under
discussion, concern about the ability of media to freely discuss matters of pubic importance declines in importance. Rather than impose high-level intention requirements as in defamation and false
light cases, it is appropriate to balance an array of contextual factors before resolving disputes. In short, if New York wished to
create a common law rule protecting the privacy interests of the
Fosters, it could do so as long as the context suggested that Svenson’s artistic impulses violated some strong social policy. That, of
course, is exactly what may have occurred here.
261

See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 575–76 (1977).
It’s also worth noting that both Zacchini and Jireh, went up on appeal after trial court
decisions on summary judgment (Zacchini lost on summary judgment, while Rush won).
The actual market impact, therefore, was never litigated in either case.
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3. Demonstration Cases
The Westboro Baptist Church of Topeka, Kansas may be the
most despised religious organization in the nation. Among other
things, the church’s members believe the United States is being
punished for its tolerance of homosexuality.263 Those who died on
9/11, in Iraq, and in other national endeavors were simply being
punished for the wayward politics of their nation.264 The funeral of
Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder, killed on March 3, 2006 in a vehicle accident while serving in Iraq, therefore became a target for
the church’s odium. A week after his death, Westboro’s pastor
Fred Phelps, now deceased,265 members of his family, and other
congregants picketed the funeral proceedings—one of tens of thousands of demonstrations they have held at funerals, churches, and
other events and locations since 1991. As is evident in a photograph
of the event,266★ the St. John Catholic Church in Westminster,
Maryland where the funeral mass was held was surrounded by supporters of the family, many carrying American flags, while the
Westboro congregants carrying their obnoxious signs were confined to a small area about one-thousand feet away.
Albert Snyder, Matthew’s father, sued seeking damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress and intrusion on seclusion,
among other claims. After he obtained a five-million dollar award in
a federal diversity action, the Supreme Court reversed and dismissed the claim.267 Two factors were critical in the decision on the
emotional distress claim—the public nature of the Westboro
Church claims about American society, and the location of the
demonstration on public land some distance away from the funer263

The church’s website makes their belief structure painfully clear. See God Hates
Fags, WESTBORO BAPTIST CHURCH, http://www.godhatesfags.com/wbcinfo/about
wbc.html [http://perma.cc/VR2Z-6W3A] (last visited Nov. 13, 2015).
264
See FAQ, WESTBORO BAPTIST CHURCH, http://www.godhatesfags.com/faq.html
[http://perma.cc/J7UT-NQ6G] (last visited Nov. 13, 2015).
265
Phelps died in 2014, but surviving members of his family carry on. See Michael
Paulson, Fred Phelps, Anti-Gay Preacher Who Targeted Military Funerals, Dies at 84, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 20, 2014, at A26.
266★
One picture is at Richard H. Chused, Snyder Funeral, APPROPRIATE(D) MOMENTS,
http://www.rhchused.com/Moments21.html [http://perma.cc/UD2H-RLW6] (last visited
Sept. 28, 2015).
267
Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 459 (2011).
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al.268 In combination, those factors bestowed a First Amendment
privilege on the demonstration.269 Though the Court has construed
the meaning of a matter of public concern broadly to include “any
matter of political, social, or other concern to the community,”270
there was little doubt that the Westboro demonstration fell within
the category. The funeral ritual itself certainly was private, but
Phelps’s church was a well-known and widely discussed entity.
The mere fact that supporters of the Snyder family gathered at St.
John Catholic Church to counteract the hate speech of Westboro
confirmed the public nature of the event. In addition, the use of
public land, the lack of any shouting or insulting language by the
Phelps supporters, and the distance of the picketing from the funeral all suggested that additional time, place, or manner limitations on the event probably were unnecessary. In short, the context
of the event made it very difficult to avoid the application of traditional First Amendment doctrine to bar the imposition of penalties
on the Westboro members.271
The intrusion on seclusion tort fell by the wayside for similar
reasons. Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, noted those disliking obnoxious speech on matters of public concern are asked to
avoid listening to it.272 Only in rare instances have the Justices approved ordinances limiting speech because the audience is “captive.” Examples include, “a statute allowing a homeowner to restrict delivery of offensive mail to his home, and an ordinance prohibiting picketing ‘before or about’ any individual’s residence.”273
As with the name disclosure and publicity rights cases, Snyder
does not limit the ability to create a tort for the benefit of the Fosters. Certainly the surreptitious taking of photographs of those in
268

Id. at 455, 457.
Id. at 458.
270
Id. at 453 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1883)).
271
See Snyder, 562 U.S. at 458 (“Given that Westboro’s speech was at a public place on
a matter of public concern, that speech is entitled to ‘special protection’ under the First
Amendment. Such speech cannot be restricted simply because it is upsetting or arouses
contempt.”).
272
Id. at 459 (“Rather . . . the burden normally falls upon the viewer to avoid further
ombardment of [his] sensibilities simply by averting [his] eyes.”) (quoting Erznoznik v.
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210–211 (1975)).
273
Snyder, 562 U.S. at 459 (internal citations omitted).
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their homes is not a matter of general public concern. Quite the
contrary is true. Indeed, Justice Roberts suggested that when at
home, occupants are in a sense “captive”—lacking the ability to
evade offensive behavior by those operating in close proximity to
the shelter.274 Nor did the picture taking occur in an area traditionally viewed as a public forum. Again, quite the contrary is true. An
open window does not a First Amendment public forum make.
While commenting on voyeurism carries free speech attributes,
acting as a voyeur may justifiably be thought of in a different
breath.
CONCLUSION
It should not surprise anyone that the secret taking and public
display of photographs of people quietly going about their lives at
home would offend many. While I would expect that any debate
over expansion of privacy doctrine to cover such matters would be
contentious, it is no longer possible for us to ignore the intrusive
qualities of digital technology. Perhaps this article will stimulate
discussion on the issues. That alone would make my authorship of
it worth the effort. The best way to conclude is simply to ask you to
look at a view from my apartment balcony on a beautiful moonlit
evening in New York City and to wonder what people across the
street might be doing.275★
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